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Caltrans Division of Innovation and Research
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A measure of atmospheric attenuation. The raw measurement generated by the
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Time To Collision (metric indicative of collision risk potential)
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Traffic Management System (CAWS Speed monitoring computer program)
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Qualimetrics Caltrans Meteorological System (or CAWS weather system)
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Summary of Results and Recommendations
1.1

Project Summary

There is significant interest by traffic management personnel in the use of automated warning systems to
provide drivers with real-time information on hazardous conditions related to traffic, limited visibility or roadway
obstructions. In this work, we evaluate a large-scale real-time driver warning system, the Caltrans Automated
Warning System (CAWS), located on the southbound direction of Interstate 5 and westbound direction of State
Route 120 as they approach the junction near the San Joaquin River in Stockton, California. The CAWS
covers 15 miles in an area known for dense recurrent fog, particularly at peak commute hours. It entered
service in November 1996. The system includes 36 traffic speed monitoring sites, nine remote meteorological
stations, and nine changeable message signs (CMS) for warning drivers. It is controlled by three computers
located in the Caltrans District 10 Transportation Management Center. This system is believed to be one of the
most advanced of its kind in the world.
We assessed the response of drivers to CAWS warning messages by measurement of traffic parameters on
an individual vehicle basis at locations before and after the first CMS of the CAWS on southbound I-5. Over a
two-year period of study, the speed, length and time of detection were recorded for every vehicle at four
detection sites: two upstream and two downstream of the CMS. Visibility sensors before and after the CMS
quantified local visibility, and surveillance cameras monitored both the traffic conditions and the actual message
displayed by the CMS. Approximately 30 million vehicles were logged at each site over the two-year study
period. During each fog or traffic event in which the CMS was activated, we examined mean speed, speed
variance and potential collision speed (PCS). PCS considers the following distance, the visibility distance and
speed of each vehicle to predict the impact speed if it had to brake abruptly, such as to avoid involvement in a
multi-car collision in fog.
The challenge in this analysis was to separate the natural tendency of drivers to slow down in fog, as well as
any site geometry effects, from the incremental affect of the CMS message. There appeared to be a consistent
average incremental speed reduction of 1.1 mph and an average increase in PCS of 8.0 mph attributable to the
CAWS warning message. Speed variance as measured by the standard deviation of the speeds of proximate
vehicles was insignificantly affected by visibility reductions or the CAWS warnings.
A microscopic analysis of each fog event revealed two effects which explain the increase in PCS with a
decrease in mean speed: (1) A subset of drivers comply to some degree with the advisory speed message.
They build more densely packed platoons behind them, with generally reduced gaps. (2) Since PCS is based
on the minimum of the following distance or the visibility distance, if visibility gets worse, PCS increases unless
there is a commensurate decrease in speed. The small average reduction in mean speed is actually
comparable with results for similar systems. The CAWS results were not expected to be as great as, for
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example, the 5-6 mph reduction reported for the Dutch DRIVE system’s dynamic speed limits that were
enforced. The CAWS only advises safe speeds for the conditions.
Despite warning messages, it is disturbing to note that during fog event events, drivers continue at mean
speeds consistently above 60 mph even in visibilities below 100 ft. Mean speeds in visibility as poor as 700
feet do not vary from speeds under clear conditions, typically 69-71 mph over all lanes, and 74-76 mph in lane
1. In fog, PCS values between 45 and 60 mph were typical, whereas PCS values during moderate traffic
averaged 20-30 mph. It would require a degree of driver compliance beyond that achieved by any warning
system we are aware of to prevent multi-car chain collisions in dense fog. All that can be achieved is small
mean speed reductions that hopefully improve the odds. This is not a weakness unique to the CAWS.
We observed a number unexpected responses of the CAWS system which lead us to discover a number of
operational problems related to software or control algorithm design issues. The response time between the
visibility or trigger event and the corresponding CMS warning message was particularly problematic, with an
average delay of over 7 minutes for fog messages, and between 3 and 6 minutes for traffic warning messages.
The size and complexity of the system created a substantial maintenance workload for the District. The system
includes three computers, nine CMSs, 45 field controllers, 216 inductive loop detectors, and 72 precision
weather instruments, communicating over 45 individual telecom circuits. Collectively these factors may have
contributed to a reduction in driver confidence in the CAWS.
The results of several analyses of collision data were mixed but generally negative. Overall collision data
showed that the CAWS was associated with increased rates of collision during the first five years after its
activation, but a consistent improvement trend after 2001. Over the period 1997-2003 compared with the
period 1992-1996, an average increase in travel-normalized collisions of 60% was observed in the study area,
compared with 30% in the CAWS control direction and 25% and 62% of on two directions of comparison
highways having somewhat higher daily traffic volumes (average 39%). For fatal and injury collisions an
increase of 77% was observed in the study area, compared with 39%, 24%, and 55% (average 39%) on the
control and comparison highways. Results for targeted accidents such as collision in fog, rear-end collisions,
or secondary collisions ran generally negative. However, for a few targeted classes of collisions such as
secondary collisions in fog, a positive effect may be evident. Controlling for the potential affects of construction,
peak and cross-peak traffic, and changes in the driver population over time did not significantly alter these
conclusions. Model-based analyses generated contradictory results. Initial models predicted a possible
reduction of 15% in overall collisions, and 12% in fatal and injury collisions, but later models indicated that the
CAWS could not be associated with a statistically significant influence on collisions in either a positive or
negative sense. Regarding the single question, “Based on collision data of all types, did the CAWS appear to
be associated with an improvement in traffic safety?” we and our expert advisory panel feel that the overall
results are inconclusive. It would not be unreasonable to infer a net positive overall benefit attributable to the
CAWS, but of unknown magnitude.
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Considering the results of all evaluation tasks together, the evaluators are of the opinion that the CAWS does
provide a positive safety benefit to a degree consistent with or slightly less than reasonable expectations as
established by similar systems in the USA or Europe. With minor modifications, its potential may be greater
than previously demonstrated. In addition, we feel that the system has demonstrated an intrinsic value in traffic
management and driver support that may transcend its immediately measurable or inferred effects on traffic
safety.

1.2

Credits

This project is a part of the California Traffic Safety Program and was made possible through the support of the
California Office of Traffic Safety, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. This project was
administered by the California Department of Transportation, Division of Research and Innovation, a unit of the
State of California Business, Transportation, and Housing Agency.

1.3

Disclaimer

The opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and not
necessarily those of the State of California Business Transportation and Housing Agency, the California
Department of Transportation or the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. This report does not
constitute a standard, specification or regulation.

1.4

Project Personnel

This work was administered by the California Department of Transportation, Division of Research and
Innovation, a unit of the State of California Business, Transportation, and Housing Agency. The Caltrans
project monitor is Andrew Lee, whose guidance and support have been critical to the successful performance
of the evaluation.
Except where noted, this report was written by the evaluation project principal investigator (PI), C. Arthur
MacCarley, Professor of Engineering at the California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, and
Principal Engineer for Loragen Corporation.
The design and deployment of the CAWS Evaluation data acquisition network and the operational analysis of
the CAWS were performed by the technical staff of Loragen Corp., including the PI, Christopher Ackles, Tabber
Watts, Vinu Somoyji, John Clanton, Alex DeSharnais and John Tucker. The analysis of driver response and
the operational assessment of the system were performed by this same group, with significant advisory input
from Ezra Hauer and Richard Van der Horst, members of the external panel of expert advisors.
To a greater extent than the PI, the statistical analysis of collision data was performed and interpreted by Ed
Sullivan, Soonjung Kim, Melanie Benibides, James Daly, Kimberly Mastako, Bridget Barrett, Tracy Stiller, and
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Justin Link, with significant advisory input from Dominique Lord, Ezra Hauer, and James Moore. Accident and
roadway construction data was provided Janice Benton of the Caltrans TASAS Unit, Leah Stokes of Caltrans
District 10, Kevin Chan of the Caltrans Division of Construction, and officer Montez of the California Highway
Patrol (CHP) in Stockton.
The methods and results employed in all analyses of this evaluation were reviewed, and substantial input was
provided by the members of our external panel of experts in traffic safety and safety assessment: Richard van
der Horst of TNO Human Factors Research in the Netherlands, Ezra Hauer of the University of Toronto,
Dominique Lord of the Univ. of Texas, James Moore of USC, and Fred Rooney of Caltrans HQ Operations
(retired). Their expertise was invaluable in the formation of the conclusions for each evaluation task from an
often diverse set of results. The major contributions of Dominique Lord, James Moore and Ezra Hauer to the
second model-based analysis of collision data are recognized.
The District 10 project manager originally responsible for the operation of the CAWS was Branch Operations
Chief Laurie Jurgens, who was succeeded in this responsibility in 2000 by Electrical Systems Chief Clint
Gregory, who served as our primary contact for the duration of the evaluation. Both worked to enlist resources
in the district to support this evaluation project. We have worked with a succession of technical support
contacts in District 10 and each have contributed information used in this report to various degrees. Among
these were Ken Robertson, Jim Eckelstone, Garry Smith, Dave McPeak, and Veronica Cipponeri (our contact
for the majority of the evaluation). All of the CAWS system logs were provided to us by Ms. Cipponeri who was
responsible for the day-to-day operation of the CAWS. Joe Silvey of Caltrans D10 and James Collins of SAIC
provided valuable technical support for the CAWS communications network. Colin Bortner and Jasmine
Noriega, student assistants in Caltrans District 10, supported our frequent information requests.
Joel Retanan and Celso Izquierdo of Caltrans Operations (now in Research and Innovation) were the authors
of the Signview and TMS computer programs, under the direction of Floyd Workmon (retired) of Caltrans
Operations. Mr. Retanan provided access to the source code for these programs and assisted us with
technical questions about the design and intended operation of the system. He served as the technical expert
behind the CAWS for the duration of the study, and his assistance was of special value. Floyd Workmon
(retired) provided many of the historical details about the evolution of the system. Additional background and
historical information was provided by Caltrans personnel Randy Iwasaki, Joe Palen, John VanBerkel, and Asif
Haq, and Teri Argerbright of Farradyne Systems Inc.
Our sincere gratitude is extended to all those who contributed and assisted our work, without whose support
this evaluation would not have been possible.
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Background

According to the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) Fatality Analysis Reporting
System (FARS), visibility-impairing fog was present and presumed a factor in 418 of the 38,309 fatal crashes
that occurred nationwide (USA) in 2002 (1). Although fog crashes account for a small percentage of all
crashes, those crashes often involve multiple-vehicle pileups and massive losses, not revealed from the raw
statistics. Fog is a transient phenomena, difficult to predict and variable in density, location, dissipation rates,
and area. The presence of fog creates a condition of greatly enhanced risk on a highway, for which most
drivers are unprepared and unable to compensate. Ultimately, driver errors precipitate collisions leading to
chain reactions with sometimes catastrophic consequences.
The magnitude and severity of such events has motivated interest in active mechanisms intended to reduce the
heightened risk during visibility reductions. The most sophisticated such mechanisms deployed to date are
automated real-time driver warning systems, capable of alerting drivers in advance of hazardous conditions,
and possibly recommending specific driver actions such as reduced speed. National Cooperative Highway
Research Program Synthesis reports in 1976 (2), 1991 (3), 1996 (4) and 2003 (5), among many other works,
have provided guidance for many contemporary detection and warning system designs, and appropriate
evaluations metrics.
Exposure of drivers to a warning message ahead of fog conditions, especially in combination with a traffic
stoppage, increases the time available for reaction, and provides drivers with improved information. While
reduced mean speed and reduced speed variance are the usual objectives, the actual effects on driver
behavior are not well understood, and may be situation-specific. There is evidence that warning and advisory
messages help to reduce variability in driver behavior, but there remain legitimate concerns about differential
driver compliance that has the potential to actually increase the non-uniformity of driver reactions. Overall
safety-enhancement objectives generally consider net effects over time.
The Caltrans Automated Warning System (CAWS) is deployed on a fifteen mile-stretch of Interstate 5 and
State Route 120, near Stockton, California. It is possibly one of the most sophisticated driver warning systems
in the world. At the time of activation, the system was unique among U.S. systems in that it incorporated a
hierarchical control strategy for fully-automated display of messages in response to a wide range of hazardous
roadway conditions, including but not limited to fog. A network of nine changeable message signs (CMS) are
capable of displaying a repertoire of seven possible automated messages in response to inputs from 36 traffic
speed sensor sites and nine automated weather stations. These include warnings of traffic slow-downs or
limited visibility ahead, and (starting January 2001) specific advisory speeds. The system first became fully
operational in November 1996.
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The CAWS system was first publicly described, prior to completion, in a 1996 NCHRP Synthesis “Reduced
Visibility Due to Fog on the Highway” (4). In this document, it was stated that the system would be designed to
perform the following functions:
•

Detect the presence of fog in the vicinity of the I-5 crossing of the San Joaquin River (the Mossdale
“Y”).

•

Detect the presence of slow-moving or stopped traffic in the southbound lanes of I-5 and westbound
lanes of Route 120 within the project limits.

•

Based on the detection of fog and slow-moving or stopped traffic, select one of a number of prescribed
alternative messages to transmit to drivers through fixed CMSs.

•

Provide a means through which other customized measures can be transmitted to drivers through the
CMSs.

•

Provide a location where the system status can be monitored in real time and where historical records
of system operation will be maintained.

The system would work cooperatively with the Central Valley Traffic Operations Center in Fresno, to the south
of the CAWS area. The system would be unique in the USA in the extent to which it is fully automated.
Historically, one of the earliest automated systems was deployed as part of the Drive II project, Roadway Safety
Enhancement System, on the A16 near Breda in the Netherlands in 1992, and evaluated over a two year period
1992-94 (6, 7). The evaluation methods used for this system, especially the emphasis on driver response,
were of particular influence in the present work. In Europe, in addition to the Dutch system, automated and
semi-automated driver warning systems have been deployed in Finland (8,11), Germany (11), Australia (11),
and England (9). Real-time variable speed limits have been implemented in Britain, Germany and the
Netherlands for many years, and are reported to result in reduced speed variance and more uniform headways
between vehicles (10). Visibility is usually an important factor in the dynamic speed limits set by these systems.
th

A comprehensive review of systems worldwide that implement variable speed limits was presented at the 79
TRB meeting (11).
Concurrent with or after the activation of the CAWS, several manual and automated systems have been
deployed in the US, including systems in Idaho (12), North Carolina (13), Oregon (14,15,16), Virginia (17),
Georgia (18,19), Tennessee (20,21), Florida (22,22), Arizona (23), Utah (24,25), and previously at
approximately the same location in California (26,27). Most have relied on manual actuation.
One system in the US worth particular mention is a system with similar capabilities deployed in 1994 along a
12-mile section of Interstate 75 in South Georgia by the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) and
Georgia Tech University (28). This system, referred to as the GDOT Fog Detection and Warning System,

consists of a network of 19 visibility sensors and 5 loop-based speed detection traps. Warning messages are
displayed on four incandescent CMSs. Messages can be either manually or automatically selected and
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actuated. Dial-up access is provided to law enforcement officials. The system presently remains in operation,
and plans for expansion are in progress.
The bibliography at the end of this report includes descriptions of all highway fog warning systems for which
published information was available at the time of this report.
All known systems have indicated some provision for effectiveness assessment, although data available and
evaluation methods have been highly variable. The referenced Florida (8) and California (10) studies in
particular recognized the lack of quantitative results in evaluations of visibility-related driver warning systems.
Successful evaluations and prior results will be discussed in later sections of this report.

1.6

History of the CAWS

The San Joaquin Valley lies in the interior of California, extending from Sacramento south to the El Tejon Pass,
at the north perimeter of Los Angeles County. The valley is known for seasonal ground fog, occurring from
approximately October through April. In arid areas of the valley, blowing dust is also a problem during highwind conditions. Interstate Highway 5 and California Highway 99 are the major north-south traffic arteries that
extend the length of this corridor. These and other smaller highways in this valley have historically been prone
to multi-car accidents during reduced-visibility conditions due to fog or dust.
The cities of Stockton and Manteca are situated in a low-lying area of San Joaquin County, which is located at
the north end of the valley. In this particular area, Highways 5 and 99 almost converge, connected by a sevenmile stretch of California Highway 120, which feeds into State Highway 205, a major artery into the San
Franciso Bay area. Traffic converges abruptly and is often heavy, comprised of both local and interstate
elements. Dense fog occurs regularly and with little warning, especially during morning and evening
commuting hours. During fog conditions, driving can become extremely hazardous. This area has previously
been used as a test bed for visibility-related traffic safety studies, such as Operation Fogbound29, a 1973 field
test of highway visibility sensors.
In 1991, growth in the greater Stockton area created an urgent need to expand the capacity of Highway 120
from 2-lanes to 4-lanes in the Mossdale area, situated between highways 5 and 99. This project eventually
became know as the Manteca Bypass Expansion, and evolved through the normal process of approvals and
environmental impact assessments. Just prior to the letting of construction contracts, a resident of Manteca,
Mike Barkley, threatened a lawsuit against the State of California citing the failure of the environmental impact
study to adequately address the problem of fog-related traffic safety. Mr. Barkley was motivated by his nearinvolvement in two fatal multi-car accidents on this stretch of highway in 1989 and had become a crusader for
some type of solution to this problem. The highway expansion project became the catalyst. Mr. Barkley found
support for his concerns in the District 10 office of the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), which
had long been concerned about the problems in the area but lacked resources to implement solutions beyond
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static warning signs, which had proven to be of little value to drivers. Similar catastrophic events nearby
contributed to a sense of urgency. On February 7, 1991, just south of the area on Highway 99, a fog-related
accident involved 75 vehicles and killed 4 people. Cooperation prevailed between Caltrans legal council Bruce
Behrens and Mr. Barkley. According to Barkley (30) “We sat down and we worked through what the problems
were and what the possible solutions were. I think Caltrans truly would like to do what it can to solve this
problem of fog-related pile-ups”
The combination of environmental and traffic conditions made this location a unique candidate for a high-tech
solution. In the assessment of John Van Berkel (31), the deputy district director for system operations, the
limited distance, converging traffic pattern in the “Mossdale Y” junction of I-5 and SR120, and high incidence of
dense ground fog made the area an ideal site for an active fog warning system.
The solution was fleshed out in discussions between Van Berkel and Cliff Rice, chief engineer for District 10
Traffic Operations. Among the primary requirements identified was driver confidence in the information
provided by the system. It was known from prior studies in this area and in Riverside, California (32) that lack
of driver trust could easily nullify any potential benefits. Another consideration was that fog in this area was
highly localized. Visibility can change dramatically between locations separated by as little as 500 feet. These
criteria dictated a network of closely spaced real-time sensors for both visibility and traffic conditions, as well as
a display system that could be seen by drivers even under very limited visibility. The system would require
automated decision-making capability for 24-hour autonomous operation, since the most egregious conditions
usually occurred at night or in the early hours of the morning.
The result was an architecture incorporating three primary elements: a network of remote meteorological
stations, a network of traffic speed monitoring stations, and the deployment of self-illuminated changeable
message signs (CMSs), all at intervals yet-to-be determined along the highway. The system envisioned would
have the capability to warn drivers in advance of potentially lethal combinations of impaired visibility and traffic
congestion, and optionally recommend appropriate actions. The system would have direct links to the
California Highway Patrol. A network of Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras would be deployed for
incident verification. A Highway Advisory Radio (HAR) system was to be added eventually to supplement the
visual driver warnings. Ultimately, the system would be the first fully automated multi-sensor multi-function
driver warning system in the United States. The deployment time frame was very limited, precluding extensive
development efforts.
Design requirements were written by Caltrans staff, and a request for proposals was issued. In mid-1991, a
concept development and feasibility study contract was awarded to Parsons Brinckerhoff’s Farradyne Systems
Incorporated (PBFSI) and Quade-Douglas (PBQD) divisions, with the intention of awarding the overall project to
this team depending on the proposal and cost estimate resulting from this work. Cliff Rice served as the first
Caltrans project manager. In mid-1992, when the resulting deployment cost estimate provided by PBFSI/QD
was considered excessive, the project was undertaken internally by a joint engineering team from Caltrans
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District 10 and Caltrans Operations Division in Sacramento. Planning, specifications and estimation was
performed by this team. In early 1993, a go-ahead for partial funding from the Caltrans State Highway
Operations Protection and Planning (SHOPP) directorate was given, for an estimated capital cost of $3 million.
A first phase would be deployed, covering approximately only half of the intended study area – just the
southbound I-5 and westbound SR-120 directions leading to the Mossdale Y. The Phase 1 deployment would
consist of nine meteorological sensor sites and nine CMS’s. The coverage area for traffic speed/count
monitoring would be more extensive: 36 sites would be installed. The intention at the time was to assess the
performance of this first phase prior to deploying a potentially larger second phase. At the date of this report,
the second phase has not been deployed.
Randy Iwasaki, deputy director of operations in District 10 became the project manager. Systems engineering
responsibilities were undertaken by Floyd Workmon of Caltrans Operations. Software design responsibilities
for implementation of the decision-making capability, CMS control, traffic speed monitoring, and data
communications would be the responsibility of Joel Retanan and Celso Izquierdo of Caltrans HQ Operations.
Qualimetrics Inc. of Sacramento was selected to provide turnkey installations of nine remote meteorological
sensor stations and a central display and communications workstation, which would be referred to as the
Qualimetrics Caltrans Meteorological System (QCMS). Each “weather station” includes a dual-axis forwardscatter visibility sensor, an anemometer, wind direction indicator, barometer, thermometer, relative humidity
(dew point) sensor, and precipitation gauge, and a telemetry system for encoding all instrument data and
transmitting to a central facility for display and recording on a PC. The software for the traffic monitoring
system (TMS) and CMS control system (a modification of the existing Caltrans “Signview” CMS control
program) were developed by Caltrans Operations. COTS (Commercial of-the-shelf) hardware was utilized
whenever possible to minimize cost and reduce deployment time. The Signview and TMS programs were
hosted on regular IBM-type DOS PC’s. Standard Caltrans specification 170 controllers were used for both the
traffic speed detection sites and the CMS interfaces. Subcontractors were engaged to install loop detectors
and CMSs. A map of the CAWS study area is shown in Figure 1.7.2.1.
The Phase 1 deployment was completed in October of 1996, under budget at a capital outlay cost of $2.5
million, not including Caltrans internal costs. The system was first activated in November 1996 and has been in
continuous service since that time.
Lacking an official designation by Caltrans, and following the suggestion of Floyd Workmon of Caltrans
Operations in 1998, the complete system was designated by the evaluators as the Caltrans (District 10)
Automated Warning System, or for convenience, the “CAWS”. The three interacting computer systems which
implement the meteorological monitoring, traffic speed monitoring, decision-making and CMS display
capabilities of the system are located in the Traffic Management Center (TMC), in the basement of Caltrans
District 10 headquarters in Stockton.
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In 1997, Cal Poly State University, San Luis Obispo was engaged through California PATH (U.C. Berkeley) to
assist Caltrans in the design and setup of an appropriate evaluation program. A preliminary evaluation design
report was completed and published by PATH in May,1999.
The winters of 1997 and 1998 were considered unusual due to the small number of occurrences of dense fog.
This was generally attributed to “El Nino” weather patterns, which bought greater than normal rains to the area.
There was an incident on Southbound I-5 at I-205 in January 1997 related to highway flooding. Warnings of
congested traffic conditions occurred on a routine basis, although fog-related warnings were few and brief. In
December 1997 a serious fog-related multi-car incident occurred in an area south of and outside the CAWS
network on Highway 5, which may have lead to enhanced interest in studying the effectiveness of the CAWS.
On September 22, 2000, a grant was obtained from the California Office of Traffic Safety by Loragen
Corporation of San Luis Obispo and administered through Caltrans Division of Research and Innovation to
design and deploy a data acquisition network capable of accurately assessing the response of drivers to the
CAWS system, and to use this system to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the safety-enhancement
effectiveness of the CAWS. A network of five field monitoring stations and a central server were designed and
set up to examine detailed traffic characteristics in support of a driver response analysis as well as to provide
monitoring functions for an operational analysis and accident statistical analysis. The development and
implement process was arduous with both technical and institutional issues to overcome. General calamities
further delayed the full operation of the evaluation system: In 2003 roadway construction destroyed the loop
detectors at the north-most evaluation site, in 2002 a major accident that destroyed the power to the area for 7
months, and communications and loop detector problems in 2001 through 2003. Continuous reliable data was
not available from this data acquisition network until summer of 2003, in time for the fog season of 2003-04.
The complete fog seasons of 2003-04 and 2004-05 served as the core evaluation periods for this study. The
CAWS evaluation system and real-time traffic and visibility data from the system were made accessible to the
public via a dynamic web site in 2002 http://caws-evaluation.loragen.com. This web site also provided secure
access by Caltrans and traffic engineering researchers to the complete database and on-line analysis tools.
A separate CAWS “weather server” was also designed and deployed at the request of Caltrans in the District
10 TMC to provide real-time monitoring of weather conditions in the CAWS area available to Caltrans
personnel on their internal Intranet.
Driver response and operational issues were evaluated over the complete 2003-04 and 2004-05 fog seasons.
A preliminary report to Caltrans on critical operational issues was submitted after the first fog season, and as a
result, some improvements in the CAWS (Signview) software were made during the summer of 2003. Accident
statistics were studied over the period 1992-1996 (before the CAWS) and 1997-2003 (after the CAWS), using
the opposite direction of traffic flow on I-5 and SR-120 as a control area. Preliminary reports from this analysis
were submitted at Caltrans’ request in 2001 and 2003. Over the course of the study, the evaluation team has
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worked closely with District personnel with common goals of assuring an accurate evaluation as well and
maintaining proper function of the CAWS.
The CAWS Evaluation Data Acquisition system was turned over to the responsibility of Caltrans District 10 in
May 2005, and it remains in operations for continued support of the CAWS and district traffic management, as
well as a pubic resource to traffic safety researchers.
This document reports the results of all components of the evaluation project, culminating in recommendations
and lessons learned for the design and operation of similar automated warning systems. Over the course of
the evaluation, much was also learned about the response of drivers to safety interventions in general, and the
measurable characteristics of traffic by which relative safety may be assessed. This study has also provided a
forum for exchange of ideas and methods with the evaluators of other driver warning systems in the USA and
internationally, in particular, the Dutch “DRIVE” project in Breda, which was similar in scale and features. A
better understanding has been gained of the relative safety value of not only the CAWS, but of dynamic driver
warning methods and systems in general.

1.7

System Description

The primary function of the CAWS is to detect the presence of reduced visibility and/or congested traffic on the
highway, and to warn drivers in advance of such conditions. The system also advises of high wind conditions,
and supports the statewide Amber Alert system. The CAWS is comprised of three primary systems, described
below:
1.7.1

Meteorological Monitoring System (Weather Monitor).

Manufactured and installed by Qualimetrics Inc. (now All Weather Systems, Inc.) of Sacramento, California.
Nine remote weather information stations (RWIS) are deployed on the southbound directions of I-5 and SR120, each including a dual axis atmospheric visibility sensor, an anemometer, wind vane, barometer,
thermometer, relative humidity sensor, precipitation gauge, day/night illumination level sensor, and a telemetry
system for encoding all instrument data and transmitting to a central facility for display, logging and generation
of “alarm threshold triggers” used by the CAWS for the display of warning messages. Data is carried over a
network of dedicated leased telephone-type lines to the Traffic Management Center (TMC) located in Caltrans
District 10 Headquarters in central Stockton. Information is displayed via a proprietary program running under
Windows 95 on a PC in the TMC. Data is retained on disk until disk capacity is exceeded, when it must be
manually backed up and erased. The PC has an RS-232 link to the Signview (main CAWS) computer,
described below. The system is isolated and not accessible by either an Internet or Caltrans Intranet network
connection.
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Traffic Monitoring System (TMS).

A total of 216 inductive loop detectors are installed in duplex (speed measurement) configurations at 36 sites,
spaced at approximately 1/2-mile intervals on the southbound directions of I-5 and SR-120 in the StocktonManteca area. Some are located at or proximate to weather stations. Six sites are designated as
communications hubs, to which all other sites are connected via twisted pair in a “star-type” network. All
installations conform generally to Caltrans and US DOT FHWA specifications and practices for field control
systems (33). Type 222 dual-channel inductive loop detector cards operating in pulse mode are used for
vehicle speed measurements, calculated by algorithms running on Caltrans Type 170 controllers. Data from
each of the six communications hub sites are brought into the District 10 TMC over dedicated and leased
telephone lines using Caltrans Type 400 (Bell L202S) 1200 bps modems at each end. Communications is fullduplex and a polling cycle of 50 seconds is used to retrieve data from all sites. Communications is completely
separate from the QCMS weather system network. Data are normally logged once every 15 minutes. Traffic
count and speed data are displayed via the Caltrans-developed TMS (Traffic Monitoring System) program
running under MS-DOS on an IBM-type Intel 386 PC located in the District 10 TMC. The program has display
and processing capabilities for up to 36 sites. Data is retained on disk until disk capacity is exceeded, when it
must be manually backed up and erased. The PC communicates with the CMS-control PC described below via
an EIA232c cable, at 9600 bps.
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Figure 1.7.2.1. Map of CAWS Study Area, from Caltrans Construction Plans.

1.7.3

Signview CMS Network and Control System.

Caltrans Model 500 (34) incandescent changeable message signs (CMS) are installed at nine locations in the
CAWS area. These were selected because self-illuminated displays have been reported to have the best
readability under adverse weather conditions (35). All CMS sites use dedicated Caltrans Type 170 controllers
for CMS control and communications. Communications is handled over leased phone lines using Caltrans
Type 400 (Bell L202S) 1200 bps multi-drop modems, connecting field sites in star clusters to a single central
monitoring PC in the District 10 TMC. The Caltrans “Signview” CMS control program was modified for
automated activation of CMS messages is used to generate and send a fixed repertoire of driver warning and
information messages to the nine CMSs. The CAWS version of this program will be referred to as
“CAWS/Signview”, or just “Signview”. The following messages are automatically displayed:
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•

2 traffic speed warnings: “Slow traffic ahead” and “stopped traffic ahead” based upon thresholds of
below 35 mph, and below 11 mph respectively.

•

The fog-related messages have been changed several times since 1996. Originally “FOGGY
CONDITION AHEAD” or “DENSE FOG AHEAD”, changed in January 2003 to “DENSE FOG AHEAD,
ADVISE 45 MPH”, or for visibility between 100 and 200 ft, “DENSE FOG AHEAD, ADVISE 30 MPH”.
Changed in summer 2004 to “DENSE FOG AHEAD, ADVISE 45 MPH” for all visibility levels less than
500 ft.

•

1 wind speed warning: “HIGH WIND WARNING” is displayed when wind speed exceeds 25 mph.

District 10 Traffic
Management Center

QCMS Meteorological
System Computer
(Pentium/Win95)

9 Qualimetrics
“Caltrans
Meteorological
System” Stations
Leased V34 BIS
multi-drop phone
lines

Signview CMS Control
Computer
(386/DOS)

9 Model 500
Changeable
Message Signs

TMS Traffic
Monitoring Computer
(386/DOS)

36 Inductive
Loop Speed
Detectors

Figure 1.7.3.1. Main components of CAWS as Deployed in District 10 Study Area.
Priority-based preemption is implemented, with traffic speed-related warnings superceding visibility and windrelated warnings. Manually-entered warning messages can be displayed at any time by operator entry, but they
are overridden by any automatically-generated messages. The Signview computer receives inputs via EIA232c
serial links from the adjacent QCMS weather monitoring and TMS traffic monitoring PCs located next to it in the
D10 TMC. The system is only accessible from the TMC. It cannot be remotely accessed either by network or
modem. Figure 1.7.2.1 shows the three main computer subsystems of the CAWS, and their respective
interactions with field sites and sensors.
The CAWS has capabilities beyond those currently in use for automated driver warning. Each of the nine
QCMS weather stations, described in Figure 1.7.2.1, include a full complement of atmospheric monitoring
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instrumentation. The central weather monitoring PC incorporates comprehensive data collection and
interpretation capabilities. Combined with the network of 36 speed monitoring stations, additional reporting,
alert generation, and data collection functions are possible. As a test bed for weather-related intelligent traffic
management, this system appears to be one of the most sophisticated in the United States, and possibly the
world.
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Figure 1.7.3.2. Detail of “Qualimetrics Caltrans Meteorological System” (QCMS) Weather Stations
Deployed in Caltrans District 10, from Qualimetrics Systems Data Sheets (36).
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Speed
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Weather
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Modem (6 Masters)
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334C
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334C
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SystemAhead
Ahead
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Figure 1.7.3.3. CAWS system overview. From presentation by Joel Retanan, Floyd Workmon and
Celso Izquierdo of Caltrans operations.
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Goals and Objectives of Study

The objectives of our evaluation focused on the effectiveness of the CAWS in improving safety and reducing
accident risk to drivers resulting from limited visibility and congested traffic conditions. “Safety” is a nebulously
defined term, which means different things to different people. To drivers, it is more likely to imply “security”,
while for transportation professional, it may be more formally interpreted in terms of accident rates (37), while in
a fundamental sense it connotes a combination of individual accident risk and potential accident severity, which
in turn manifest in the form of accident rates and loss factors accumulated over time. We attempt to evaluate
system effectiveness at different levels reflecting these multiple views of safety. The evaluation attempted to
conform to FHWA guidelines, as articulated by Mitre in 1994 (38).
Prior work in the area of traffic safety evaluation is extensive, and can only be selectively recognized here. In
the 1981, the European Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published
“Methods for Evaluating Road Safety Measures,” which went at length into measures of relative highway safety
and risk. They define the “risk of a road” user as “the number of accidents or casualties per exposure,” and
emphasized that “exposure ought to describe directly or indirectly situation in traffic which correspond to
accident situations” (39). NCHRP Synthesis 295 (40) advised on acceptable statistical methods in highway
safety analysis. An excellent paper by Hauer addressed the limitations of statistical analysis of accident data
(41). We follow the recommendations of these documents in Section 4 of this report, an analysis of historical
and recent collision data.
In 1997, the Center for Urban Transportation Research at the University of South Florida performed a needs
analysis for Tampa Bay and reviewed the state-of- practice in fog detection and motorist warning systems (42).
They developed a four-step process for evaluating fog-detection technologies, which was published by Turner
and Pietzyk in the February 2000 Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE) Journal (43).
We first assess the ability of the system to influence the behavior of drivers, and attempt to answer the
question: do drivers respond to CAWS warning messages as intended by the system’s designers? We then
examine the actual operation and mechanics of the system operation, assessing whether the system performs
as expected and if the traffic control actions taken by the system are safety-enhancing. At the highest level, we
perform a statistical analysis of accident data gathered before and after the deployment of the CAWS.
The evaluation was divided into three areas of study encompassing the contractual tasks and reflecting
increasing levels assessment as articulated above. These are summarized below. The complete reports from
each area of study are the contents of Volume 2, 3 and 4 of this overall document.
Throughout this report we will use the words “accident”, “collision”, and “crash” as synonymous, consistent with
common practice in traffic safety literature.
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Assessment of the influence of the CAWS on driver behavior

We assessed the ability of the system to influence driver behavior, as intended by the system designers. A
network of sensors and data acquisition systems was deployed to examine the detailed characteristics of the
traffic flow in the road segments immediately before and after drivers view a message on the first CMS of the
CAWS. During events in which the CMS was activated, we analyze the distributions of vehicles speeds and
separations and infer from this the relative safety of the traffic, geographically before and after the CMS, and in
the time periods prior to and following the activation of the CMS. We seek to differentiate between normal
changes in driver behavior as a reaction to the fog itself, and driver behavior changes in reaction to the CMS
message. The analysis of driver response is the subject of Volume 2 of this report.
1.8.2

Technical and Operational Assessment

Two original contractual tasks were consolidated due to overlap and the natural synergy between the two.
These are treated in a single volume ‘Technical and Operational Assessment’:
Technical Assessment - Examination of engineering design and operational documentation, and inspection of
facilities, to provide a sense of the soundness of the design and implementation, and effectiveness of the
integration of the system and subsystem components.
Operational Assessment - Assess the operation of the system directly by observing the actions taken by the
system and their direct effects on traffic. Investigate technical reasons for any anomalies observed. We
accomplish this by study of log files generated by each of the CAWS systems, as well as data generated by the
evaluation data acquisition network. We examine a series of complete events during which the CAWS
responded to traffic or weather conditions, and attempt to derive from these the actual control strategy of the
system from examination of the Signview and TMS program source code (since no formal documentation of
the control strategy had been created). We report attributes and deficiencies of the system as actually
deployed.
1.8.3

Assessment of long-term impact of CAWS on accidents

By examination of archived accident records over several years prior to and several years after the activation of
the system, we attempt to ascertain if the system is having a positive impact as reveled by accident statistics
and fitted models. The before-CAWS years consisted of 1991 though October 1996. The after-CAWS years
consisted of 1997-2003, the most recent full year for which accident data was available from the Traffic
Accident Surveillance and Analysis System (TASAS) database. The two-month period November-December
1996 was not considered since it was the startup transition period for the system. The primary control area
used in the study was the opposite direction of traffic flow on I-5 and SR-120, although a wider range of control
areas including the SR-120/I99 junction area was added for comparison in some of the analyses including the
multivariate modeling exercise. The statistical analysis of accident data is the subject of ‘Evaluation of Traffic
Safety Influence Based on Historical Collision Data’, Volume 4 of this report.

19

Evaluation of Caltrans Automated Warning System

Summary of Results and Recommendations

Volume 5 of this report describes the operation and technical details of the CAWS Evaluation Data Acquisition
System.

1.9

Methodology

Detailed descriptions of the methodologies associated with each method of evaluation are described in the
corresponding analysis section. A summary is provided below.
1.9.1

Assessment of the Influence of the CAWS on Driver Behavior

We non-intrusively monitored traffic before and after drivers were exposed to the first CMS encountered upon
entering the CAWS area on I-5. Two monitoring stations were located on the roadway before drivers
encountered the first CMS. These stations are located 0.8 and 0.7 miles respectively from a local high point in
the roadway (the French Camp Road Overcrossing) that blocks the view of the CMS from approaching drivers.
The CMS is located 0.5 miles after this high point and is only visible in this interval. Two monitoring stations
were located immediately after drivers have encountered the CMS, the first approximately 0.5 mile after the
CMS and the second approximately 0.6 mile after the first but well before the sight distance to the next CMS of
the CAWS system. The locations of these evaluation monitoring sites are shown in Figure 1.9.1.1 that also
shows the locations of all deployed elements in the study area. Figure 1.9.1.2 is a composite aerial photograph
of the locations of the evaluation monitoring stations.
All stations collected individual records of the time of arrival, speed and length of every vehicle in each of the
three lanes at each site. Duplex inductive loop detectors were used in each lane to detect the time of arrival (to
0.01 second) and speed (to 0.1 mph) of each vehicle. Forward dispersion visibility sensors monitored local
visibility at each of the innermost before and after sites. Video cameras were deployed before, at, and after the
CMS for visual verification of traffic and visibility conditions. The message displayed by the CMS was
monitored by direct interception of communications, and verified by a video camera. Data were retained locally
until transmitted and verified over wireless connections to a central server. The server also hosted the CAWS
evaluation web site http://caws-evaluation.loragen.com which provided public access to real-time data and the
complete database. Figure 1.9.1.3 is a diagram showing the details of the components that constitute the
evaluation system.
The CMS is actuated solely by the Mathews Road Weather Station (WS1), which is the same as our first AfterCMS monitoring site. During the first complete fog season (Nov. 2003- Apr 2004), the CMS displayed two prepreprogrammed messages: “DENSE FOG AHEAD, ADVISE 45 MPH” when fog-visibility was between 200 and
500 ft., and “DENSE FOG AHEAD, ADVISE 30 MPH” when fog-visibility was between 100 and 200 ft. When
fog-visibility dropped below 100 ft., no message was displayed. During the second complete fog season (Nov.
2004- Apr 2005), the CAWS displayed a single warning message for all fog visibilities less than 500 ft.:
“DENSE FOG AHEAD, ADVISE 45 MPH”. Only fog-related visibility is recognized. No message is displayed if
relative humidity is less than 75% regardless of the visibility reading.
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Figure 1.9.1.1. CAWS study area, showing location of evaluation monitoring sites at north entrance on
Interstate 5.
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From the raw data, we calculated mean speed, speed variance (measured as sample standard deviation), and
potential collision speed* for all vehicles detected within a 45-second moving window, incremented every 15
seconds. This approach facilitated nearly instantaneous measurements of each metric based on a small set of
vehicles proximate in both time and position on the roadway. When restricted to such a short period, speed
variance differs from variance measured over an entire event in that it considers only interactions between
vehicles whose movements can potentially affect each other. The narrow time window also permits the
observation of rapid transients, for example, immediately following the activation of a CMS message. But
because of the small number of vehicles accumulated, these measurements can be prone to sample noise.
*Potential collision speed (PCS) may be interpreted as the predicted impact speed if the vehicle encounters an
obstruction on the highway (as in a multi-car collision in fog). It is a nonlinear function of the initial speed and
separation of each vehicle pair, the local visibility distance, and the driver reaction distance and braking
distance at that speed. This metric was used as a means to factor in both the visibility sight distance and the
following distance between successive vehicles at a given speed. It is predicated on the possibility of rear-end
collision between vehicles in fog, and used as a progressive indication of relative or comparative danger for
each vehicle in the event of a traffic disturbance. Its range extends from 0 mph, which means the vehicle could
safely brake to a stop, to as high as vehicle free (initial) speed, this maximum value equivalent to the vehicle
impacting the obstruction before even starting to brake. Or equivalently, it could not avoid collision with a
vehicle in front of it even if that vehicle braked normally to a stop. Such a metric was appropriate in this study
since 68.8% of collisions that occurred in fog in the study area from January 1997 to December 2003 were
classified by the California Highway Patrol as “rear end” or “hit object” collisions (44).

v = vehicle speed (ft/sec or m/s)

v

v 0 = vehicle speed prior to braking

v0

x = distance traveled (ft. or meters)

vimpact

x
min{ x vis , x following }
xreact

xbrake

Figure 1.9.1.4. Potential collision speed (impact velocity) v.s. separation distance or visibility distance.
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This and several related metrics appropriate for this study are discussed and derived in Section 2 of this report.
The nonlinear relationship between speed, separation distance and visibility distance is plotted in Figure
1.9.1.4. In this figure, the curve is parametric with the initial vehicle speed. A separate number, in mph, is
generated for each vehicle.
1.9.2

Technical and Operational Assessment

Initially we examined a sample of ten of the 36 traffic monitoring sites and remote weather stations that
comprise the CAWS field sensors. The objective of this task was primarily to verify and document the system
under test. Components included in this assessment were the Qualimetrics forward scatter visibility sensor, QNet Data Acquisition System, day/night detector, anemometer, wind direction sensor, hygrometer, rain gauge,
barometer, power supply, relay/telemetry system, network controller, and central processor hardware.
The contractual task of the technical and operational assessment was to examine the implementation of the
system, and determine if the system performed according to the original design expectations and operators’
assumptions. We documented but did individually evaluate each of the key elements of the CAWS. We then
observed the response of the automated system to a range of conditions that triggered, or should have
triggered, a warning message on one or more of the nine changeable message signs. The responses either
confirmed the basic function of the system as designed, or revealed unexpected behaviors that required deeper
investigation. When necessary to explain these unexpected behaviors, we identified the actual control strategy
by detailed examination of the CAWS/Signview or TMS computer logs and source code, in addition to data
available from our evaluation data acquisition network. We dug as deep as necessary to get to the bottom of
any unexplained system behaviors and their potential effects on the core driver warning functions of the
system. We examined the operational characteristics of the CAWS via a number of case histories indicative of
the range of possible responses of the system to speed-related and visibility-related trigger events. All data
were obtained from the Signview, TMS, or QCMS log files, or when applicable, the CAWS Evaluation System
database.
1.9.3

Analysis of Historical Collision Data

We examined historical accident data both overall and in a large number of subclasses, including accidents in
fog, inclement weather, in the absence of construction, during peak and off-peak periods, cross-peak
comparisons, primary and secondary accidents, and the proportions of accidents by CHP Type class such as
rear-end, side-swipe, etc.
We attempted to control for external effects in a large number of ways. These included normalization of
accident frequencies to various metrics of exposure, including travel volume (MVM), annual number of fog or
inclement weather days, and each type or class of collision relative to all collisions, or other types of classes of
collisions. We considered accident severity indicated by totals of fatal and injury accidents, property damage
only accidents, and the number of vehicle involved in each reported accident.
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We examined the locations of collisions, including the specific location of fatal accidents and accidents
attributable to fog. Subsection sizes ranged from the three primary subsections of the CAWS (I-5 north of SR120, I-5 south of SR-120, and SR-120 itself) to 0.25 mile segments intended to show in greater detail the
locations of possible problem areas.
We especially considered the possible influence of roadway construction by repeating several prior analyses
with these accidents removed from the data set.
In all analyses we compared the area influenced by the CAWS (the CAWS study direction) with a primary
control area consisting of the opposite directions of the same highways, as well as two external highways used
as supplemental control areas for some analyses. This helped to control for effect such as the change in the
national speed limit or changes in driver attitudes that affected all areas at the same time.
We also fitted accident data acquired from both the CAWS and the supplemental control areas to various
configurations of a multivariate model. By computer optimization of the model parameters for best fit, we
inferred the possible influence of the CAWS on collision frequencies in segments of the CAWS study direction
compared with segments of the other areas without the CAWS.
By this comprehensive process, we have attempted to not only infer the effectiveness of the CAWS in an
overall sense, but to identify possible problem areas and corroborate the findings with driver behavior and
operational assessment results from the other sections of this report, seeking to match statistical observations
with possible causal chains.
This analysis was restricted to historic and recent numeric accident data obtained from TASAS and accident
record reports maintained in the Caltrans District 10 office. We did not perform a detailed analysis of the text of
accident reports, which might provide increased but more subjective insight into the role of CAWS in individual
accidents. We did not conduct driver surveys that may have (with a high noise margin) revealed personal
opinions or experiences of drivers about the effectiveness of the CAWS.

1.10 Summary of Results
A summary of the results and findings from the individual analyses contained in Volumes 2 through 4 are
presented below.
Using the advanced instrumentation we designed and deployed at the north entrance to the CAWS on I-5, we
studied the response of drivers to the warning message displayed by the CAWS. Over a two-year period of
evaluation encompassing two complete fog seasons, a record of every vehicle on southbound I-5 was acquired
at two sites before and two after the first changeable message sign encountered by drivers entering the CAWS
area on I-5. Since this is the first CMS drivers would be exposed to in the CAWS, it was expected that their
reaction to this CMS would be the most significant. We compared traffic observations before and after the
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CMS, and during the time periods before, after and during the CMS display. We examined every event which
activated the CMS for fog, traffic or wind.
Over all periods in which a CMS message was displayed, there is evidence that a message may enhance the
existing tendency of drivers to reduce mean speed and increase Potential Collision Speed (PCS) as visibility
decreases. This effect is small, however. The speed response of drivers is summarized in one of our many
views of the data, a plot of mean speeds at each site as a function of visibility in Figure 1.9.3.1. The ‘after’ sites,
represented by the upper two (blue and green) traces, benefit from the CMS warning message, while the
‘before’ sites, represented by the lower two (red and yellow) traces, do not.

All Lanes
72
71
70

Sites after the CMS

For visibility below 500 feet,
warning message affects the
‘after’ sites only.

69
68
67

Sites before the CMS

Mean Speed (MPH)

66
65
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Fog warning message ‘on’ in this
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Figure 1.9.3.1. Mean speed as a function of visibility, all lanes at each site, day and night.
The significance of this plot, which represents over 300,000 vehicles, each recorded at four sites, is found in
the difference in mean speeds between the two before and two after sites for visibilities below 500 feet,
denoted by the dashed red vertical line. Below 500 feet, the CMS would display a warning message that would
have been seen by drivers before arriving at the two after sites. Mean speeds in clear weather at
approximately 1 mph faster at the ‘after’ sties than the ‘before’ sites, which are separated by 1.7 miles. Mean
speeds decrease monotonically with the decrease in visibility at all sites. At the critical 200 ft visibility level,
mean speed decreases by approximately 4 mph before the CMS, approximately 5 mph after the CMS. While
speeds at the ‘after’ sites remain equal or higher, the differential effect may be attributed to the exposure of
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drivers to the warning message, since all other attributes including the volume and traffic composition are
identical at each site. The trend is not sustained at very poor visibilities such as 100-150 feet, but these
situations are much less frequent than visibilities in the 200-500 foot range which dominate the mean
calculations.
When segregated into measurements of each metric at each site, both in and out of fog, it is possible to isolate
to a greater degree the effect of the CMS message from the natural response of the drivers: The CMS
messages appeared to be responsible for an average incremental speed reduction of 1.1 mph and an average
increase in PCS of 8.0 mph. Speed variance, as measure by the standard deviation of the speeds of proximate
vehicles, was insignificantly affected.
Ramifications for traffic safety are contradictory: the speed reduction suggests increased safety, while the
increase in PCS suggests decreased safety. Nevertheless, it appears that the system is achieving its desired
affect. At least some subset of drivers is responding to the warning messages by decreasing their speed,
although not nearly as much as advised: mean speeds remain above 60 mph even when visibility is below 200
feet. But as only a minority of drivers comply, the relative safety of the following distances, as indicated by
PCS, are possibly being compromised – an unintended effect of almost any traffic management intervention
intended to reduce traffic speeds (including reduced statutory speed limits).
The apparent paradox is due to two possible phenomena:
1. PCS is based on the minimum of the visibility distance or the following distance. When speeds are
excessive for the visibility conditions, the visibility distance determines the PCS. If visibility gets progressively
worse, PCS increases unless there is a commensurate decrease in speed. For example, as visibility
decreases from 200 to 100 feet, a vehicle traveling at a constant 60 mph will report an increase in PCS from
39.9 mph to 55.6 mph. For PCS to remain 39.9 mph as the vehicle moves into the 100 ft visibility zone would
require a speed decrease to 47.7 mph. Yet the prevention of multi-car collisions in fog requires exactly this.
This explanation is pertinent to sparse traffic, typical during night and early morning hours. Since the
overwhelming number of fog events occurred during these time periods, and in most cases the visibility
gradient worsens as drivers transition from before to after the CMS, this phenomena is responsible for the
majority of the 8.0 mph mean increase in PCS reported over all fog events.
2. In higher traffic densities, such as those encountered during the morning rush hour, a different phenomenon
was observed. A subset of drivers slow down a few mph. The majority ignore the CMS. Those that slow down
build more densely-packed platoons behind them that persist for at least the 1.1 miles from the CMS to the
second ‘after’ site.

The response of traffic is demonstrated in Figure 1.9.3.2 below, a pictorial diagram of

actual traffic observed before and after viewing the warning message “DENSE FOG AHEAD, ADVISE 45 MPH”
on December 17, 2004 at approximately 7:10 AM. Visibility at all sites was approximately 200 feet.
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Approximately the same group of vehicles is depicted (matched by vehicle length and queue position), adjusted
appropriately for travel time at each site. This view shows the apparent effect of a single vehicle slowing down,
creating a platoon of increased density behind it. The net effect is manifests as a reduction in mean speed,
and even a decrease in speed variance since all vehicles in each platoon tend to conform closely to the same
speed. But PCS reveals the effect of the reduction in the following distances inside the platoon.
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Figure 1.9.3.2. Traffic characteristics before and after CMS warning.

Is a reduction of 1.1 mph a significant response for a system of this type? In our review of other driver warning
systems of this type worldwide, we consistently found impacts which differed from design expectations. As
noted in the Driver Response Analysis, the evaluators of the ADVISE system (containing a single CMS) in Utah
observed that when advised of a reduced safe speed in fog, speed variance was reduced but mean speed
increased by 15%. The system probably most similar to the CAWS is the A16 active warning system in the
Netherlands. The evaluators of this system reported an average reduction of mean speed of 5-6 mph at sites
which benefited from dynamic speed limits, with almost no change speed variance. But there was a major
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difference: the CAWS displays only advisory speeds. The dynamic speeds displayed by the A16 system were
statutory. And European drivers on intercity motorways may demonstrate greater compliance with traffic
management interventions in general. A number of studies in the USA and aboard have confirmed that drivers
largely disregard statutory speeds, ignore advisory speed limits, and respond only to their own judgment based
upon their perceptions – sometimes with fatal consequences in dense fog. From this perspective, the 1.1 mph
mean speed decrease is strong evidence that drivers are actually responding to the system. Aspirations for
speed compliance anywhere near the actual advisory speed would be totally unrealistic.
Can this possibly be effective in the reduction of catastrophic multi-car chain collisions in fog? Despite warning
messages, it is disturbing to note that during fog event events, drivers in the CAWS area continued at mean
speeds consistently above 60 mph even in visibilities below 100 ft. Observed mean speeds in visibility as poor
as 700 feet did not differ from speeds under clear conditions, typically 69-71 mph over all lanes, and 74-76 mph
in lane 1. Speed standard deviation was almost invariant with visibility conditions or the state of the CMS,
staying within the range of 5-7 mph. In fog, PCS values between 45 and 60 mph were typical, whereas PCS
values during moderate traffic averaged 20-30 mph. Note that if PCS approaches equality with the mean traffic
speed, every vehicle on the highway would collide with an obstruction such as a prior collision without ever
having the chance to brake. Or equivalently, a rear-end collision could not be avoided even in the case of
normal full braking of a lead vehicle. This value of PCS is equivalent to an effective (visibility distance limited)
gap time of 0.75 seconds, well below the 1.6 second limit generally recognized as the threshold of unsafe car
following. Even a minor traffic disturbance could trigger a chain reaction. It would require a degree of driver
compliance beyond that achieved by any warning system we are aware of in the world to achieve a sufficient
uniform speed reduction to prevent multi-car chain collisions in dense fog. All that can be achieved is small
mean speed reductions that hopefully improve the odds. This is not a weakness unique to the CAWS.
Could the CAWS be more effective in terms of driver compliance? The Operational Assessment of this report
identifies a number of problems with the CAWS control strategy, some of which could contribute to reduced
driver confidence in the CAWS. These include a lack of synchronization between fog warning messages such
that drivers see a progression of possibly different advisories as they drive through the CAWS area; failure to
activate warning messages for stopped traffic ahead unless all lanes drop below 50 mph, even if some lanes
are blocked; failure to activate due in poor visibility if the relative humidity reading does not report RH>75%; and
in the first year of operation, incorrect mapping of warnings to the intended CMSs. Possibly most significant in
possibly reducing driver confidence is the lag time between an activation threshold (fog or speed) due to
multiple polling cycles required prior to CMS activation. We observed an average delay of over 7 minutes for
fog messages, and between 3 and 6 minutes for traffic warning messages. For transient fog conditions and
rapidly forming traffic situations, delays of this magnitude can completely misalign the trigger condition with the
warning message. The relative amounts of time the CMS 1 correctly and incorrectly displayed fog warning
messages triggered by the fog sensor at weather station 1 are shown in Table 1.9.3.1 over the entire two-year
period of the driver response analysis.

30

Evaluation of Caltrans Automated Warning System

Summary of Results and Recommendations

Table 1.9.3.1. CAWS activation delay for fog messages at CMS 1.
Visibility
<500ft
Total duration of
display in minutes:

>500ft

Total

11145 732928.5 744073.5

CMS Message
With Fog
Without Fog
Events
None Fog
Fog
166

2557 8588

2042.5

The table shows that during this period a fog warning message was displayed which matched the sensor data a
total of 8588 minutes. But for 2557 minutes, no message was displayed when one was warranted. And for
2042 minutes, a fog warning message was displayed even though conditions no longer warranted it. (Times
that a traffic warning message superceded the fog message were counted as valid fog messages.) The
symmetry between the failures to warn and the false warning suggests that response lag is a much more
significant contributor to incorrect CMS activations than any other factors the might affect the generation of fog
warning messages.
It would be hard to believe that these factors did not have a deleterious effect on driver confidence in the
system, at least for regular commuters. But the potential improvement, if any, cannot be predicted. It’s
important to note also that driver confidence is established from long-term experience on all roads, not just the
CAWS, so that the CAWS could easily be a victim of inconsistent or unrealistic safety interventions state-wide
to worldwide. Regardless, the extent of the confidence-degrading operational characteristics leads the
evaluators to believe that the CAWs could potentially be more effective, possibly in to a substantial degree.
All weather station components were found to be operational and installed competently and in a professional
manner. In fact, the sophistication of each weather station was well beyond the basic fog detection needs of
the CAWS – each was an FAA-approved RWIS (Remote Weather Information System) normally deployed at
airports. However, the periodic maintenance, repair and calibration requirements for the 72 precision weather
instruments and related communications components were significant, and this workload stressed the staff and
budget resources of the District. Weather system logs showed that some weather sensor information from one
or more sites was usually missing at any particular time.
The CAWS relied on a total of 216 inductive loop detectors for its speed measurements, and at any time, at
least some of these had problems. This is generally to be expected for highway loop detectors that are
normally used for traffic management information rather than as critical sensors in an intelligent autonomous
traffic management system. Communications were dependent upon leased line service provided by the local
telco, Pacific Bell. This service was not completely reliable. While we did not have access to actual uptime
records, we can infer from the Signview and TMS data logs over the two years of our driver behavior study that
communications problems of various kinds were probably the most significant down-time issue for the CAWS.
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Finally, we considered the effectiveness of the CAWs based on an examination of collision data, before and
after the activation of the CAWS in November 1996, and in comparison with a control and two external
comparison areas.
Based on both raw and all normalizations of the data, encompassing all weather conditions, traffic levels, and
collision classes, we found the CAWS associated with increased rates of collision during the first five years
after its activation, but a consistent improvement trend after 2001. Over the entire period 1997-2003 compared
with the period 1992-1996, an average increase in travel-normalized collisions of 60% was observed in the
study area, compared with 30% in the CAWS control direction and 25% and 62% of on two directions of
comparison highways having somewhat higher daily traffic volumes (average 39%). For fatal and injury
collisions an increase of 76.6% was observed in the study area, compared with 39.1%, 23.8%, and 55.3%
(average 39.4%) on the control and comparison highways. Particularly problematic peaks were observed in
1997 and 2000-01. Results for targeted accident such as collision in fog, rear-end collisions, or secondary
collisions ran more generally negative. However, for a few targeted classes of collisions such as secondary
collisions in fog, a positive effect may be evident. Controlling for the potential affects of construction, peak and
cross-peak traffic, and changes in the driver population over time did not significantly alter these conclusions.
In an attempt to better correlate collision rate changes with individual influences, we fitted data in the CAWS
and the three comparison areas to several generalized linear regression models. Results were mixed. Our
initial analysis suggested that the presence of the CAWS may be associated with a modest overall safety
improvement. Best model configurations in this effort resulted in predictions of a possible reduction of 15% in
overall collisions, and 12% in fatal and injury collisions. However, a subsequent effort using models
recommended by our expert advisory panel concluded that the CAWS could not be associated with a
statistically significant influence on overall collisions in either a positive or negative sense, and that the CAWS
may be associated with a small increase in fatal and injury collisions. It was not possible to reliably model
collisions in fog due to the relatively low numbers of this type of collision in all areas.
The somewhat large variations in collision rates year-to-year that appear in most of the per-year data
presentations are also cause for concern when we attempt to interpret these results. Travel volume appears to
play a dominant and nonlinear role in these variations, but other undetermined factors are clearly at work.
Regarding the single question, “Based on collision data of all types, did the CAWS appear to be associated with
an improvement in traffic safety?” we and our expert advisory panel feel that the overall results are
inconclusive. It is clear to us that by qualified but arguable choices of emphasis and admission of results, an
overall conclusion could be driven in either direction. It would not be unreasonable to infer a net positive overall
benefit attributable to the CAWS, but of unknown magnitude.
We can, however, present meaningful answers and conclusions to a wide range of more restricted questions,
dealing with collision rate trends, specific collision types, severity, weather conditions, highway segments, and
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the effects of a wide range of factors including traffic volume, congestion, roadway construction activities,
speed, and more. Most important among these observations are:
All analyses concur that after the activation of the CAWS, there was a disproportionate elevation in collision
rates of all classes and under all conditions at the Mossdale Y junction of southbound I-5 and westbound SR120. This observation may be consistent with our finding of control strategy problems that particularly affect is
area, but this can’t be confirmed from accident reports or other definitive sources.
Results for SR-120 and I-5 north of SR-120 were considerably better, varying about a neutral-to-slightlynegative result in most analyses. On midday weekdays and weekend days, the results are neutral for the
CAWS overall. The results are negative for the CAWS during weekday commuting and weekend evenings.
During inclement weather, the collision rates increased in the CAWS study direction compared with other
areas. During higher levels of service, collision rates in the study direction increased substantially compared
with other areas. For lighter levels of service, results are close to neutral.
Of particular concern were collisions in fog, since the CAWS was specifically designed to reduce these. There
appear to be desirable outcomes for the study directions on SR-120 and I-5 north of SR-120, however
collisions in fog increased substantially on southbound I-5 south of SR-120. For secondary collisions in fog, a
change in the collision type mix and lower increase than other areas suggest a positive effect for the CAWS,
although the numbers are a bit small to be considered reliable. For all weather conditions, there was a
substantial increase in the percentage of rear-end collision in the CAWS study direction after the CAWS
compared with before the CAWS. When only rear-end collisions in fog are considered, the numbers also
increased after the CAWS, but the amount of the increase was substantially less than the corresponding
increase in the control areas.
The results of the examination of collision data, both positive and negative, should be considered in view of the
limited response of drivers to CAWS warning messages confirmed in the Driver Behavior Analysis. It is
possible that drivers do not alter any aspect of their driving behavior, but do benefit from a heightened
awareness of potential hazards beyond the information provided by their own perceptions. This effect would be
expected even from static advisory signage. We cannot enter the minds of drivers. But their measurable
actions lead us to limit the range of influence that could possibly be attributed to the CAWS. It appears unlikely
that drivers respond to dynamic messages to a sufficient degree to influence collision rates substantially in
either a positive or negative sense. As previously discussed, this is a characteristic of motorists that is not
necessarily attributable to the CAWS. Within these limits, it is our opinion that the CAWS had a sufficiently
positive effect on the behavior of drivers to justify an optimistic view of the collision data.

33

Evaluation of Caltrans Automated Warning System

Summary of Results and Recommendations

1.11 Interpretation and Recommendations
The CAWS is impressive in both its level of innovation and potential. It was an ambitious project – one of the
first and the largest fully autonomous driver information system of its kind in the world at the time of its
activation. The fact that it was conceived, designed, implemented and is operated entirely by the engineering
staff of a state agency not traditionally known for development of state-of-the-art technologies is a testament to
the foresight, management and wealth of expertise in the agency. This was an experiment and investment that
few other state transportation agencies have attempted. The evaluators considered it both a challenge and an
exceptional learning opportunity to study every component and characteristic of this system over a period of
years, and ultimately gain a fair and comprehensive sense of its effectiveness and potential. Beyond the
results reported herein, the lessons learned are considered directly portable to the decision process for other
active safety interventions of this type.
With a project of such ambitious proportions and goals, there is a natural tendency toward expectations beyond
what is possible. Public expectations create pressures for glowing sound bites. The ever-present scarcity of
resources demands evidence of a maximum return on the safety investment. Ultimately the most this or any
driver information system can do is influence driver behavior, ideally in a way consistent with its advisory
messages, but in general, any safety-enhancing way. It is easy to lose the perspective of how little drivers
respond to any attempt to moderate speed, even statutory speed limits (discussed in Driver Response
Analysis). In our examination of the CAWS, we kept reality in mind, and attempted to structure a
comprehensive evaluation that looked not only at every possible measure of its safety effectiveness but also
the details of its implementation which ultimate facilitate this effectiveness, and the ancillary benefits of the
system. Considerations included lessons learned and experience gained as well as number crunched.
Evans, in a significant summary work on traffic safety (45) emphasized the importance of a “behavioral
feedback factor” associated with any change in a roadway safety element, which could either amplify or negate
the intended safety benefit. He cited several cases in which improved driver information actually resulted in
overall detrimental effects on safety. One case, originally reported by Hakkert and Mahalel in 1978 (46),
involved the modification of traffic signals in Israel to display a blinking green during the last 2-3 seconds of the
green phase. They reported that this modification lead to an increase rather than the intended decrease in
crashes.
Evans introduced the following relationship between the actual effect on safety ∆S Act , and the expected or
engineered safety effect ∆S Eng

∆S Act = (1+ f )∆S Eng
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where f referred to as the human behavior feedback factor, which can take positive or negative values. If f is
zero, then the actual effect on safety is exactly as predicted by the intended or engineered effect.
In the case of the CAWS, one might consider ∆S Eng to be the effect on speed or the reduction in collisions and
collision severity that the presentation of fog and traffic warning messages was expected to engender. ∆S Act is
the resultant effect, when human behavior feedback is factored in. The specific value of ∆S Eng is
indeterminate, as is usually the case. The intentions of the system architects were to achieve the best safety
improvement possible given the deployed resources.
If Evan’s formula is applicable in this case, the CAWS results would suggest a value of f which is in a range,
for example, −1.0 < f < −0.5 allowing for the mixed results of different views of the data. Indeed, there was
surely some element of adaptation to the CAWs deployment, perhaps an increased sense of driver confidence
based on the belief that advanced warning of hazards ahead would be provided by the CAWS. Or
alternatively, a heightened sense of awareness based solely on the ‘reminder to drive more safely’ provided by
CAWS CMSs, whether activated or not.
In a controversial recent work (47), Noland presents extensive data that shows that almost any highway
improvement, most justified as safety enhancements, results in an increase in serious and fatal accidents.
Common to both of the above-cited, and many other works on traffic safety, is the recognition that traffic safety
enhancements of any kind rarely result in the effects predicted by intuition which focuses on the modification
alone; drivers almost always adapt in ways that are often difficult if not impossible to predict.
It may not be surprising, then, that a well-intended improvement in driver information did not result in effects
exactly as intended. In the present case, this inconsistency may be at least partially explained by a lack of
driver confidence in the system, and issues discussed in the Technical and Operational Assessment may have
played a small part. But based on the conclusions of other studies, the lack of a greater response is
predominantly related to the general characteristics of motorists. Driver confidence is established over longer
periods of time, and is dependent on the believability of signage, both static and dynamic, on all highways, not
only the CAWS area. And significant changes in driver attitudes toward compliance with advisory messages
are well outside the capabilities of the CAWS, or probably anything less than a greatly increased presence of
law enforcement.
Considering the conclusions of all evaluation tasks together, the evaluators are of the opinion that the CAWS
does provide a positive safety benefit, to a degree consistent with or slightly less than reasonable expectations
as established by similar systems in the USA or Europe. We also feel that with minor corrections and
enhancements, mostly in software, its potential may be greater than previously demonstrated. In addition, we
feel that there is intrinsic value to a driver warning system of this sophistication that may transcend its
immediately measurable or inferred affects on traffic safety, for example, reduction of congestion, faster
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incident management, reduced travel time via driver advisories, Amber Alert capabilities, improved traffic and
weather monitoring in general, direct interaction with news media, and even just an enhanced public awareness
that Caltrans cares about their safety.
On the potential of the CAWS: As discussed in the Technical and Operational Assessment, the central control
architecture of the CAWS facilitates much more sophisticated control strategies than those currently
implemented. Features which could easily be incorporated in software include sensor validation and
consensus by multi-site cross-checking, progressive fog warning based on inputs from all fog detectors treated
concurrently, graceful degradation in the event of component failure, the ability to ignore incorrect information
from field sensors and extrapolate reasonable values, and predictive warning strategies based upon detection
of traffic and weather trends. Redundant distributed processing and/or communications paths could also
reduce vulnerability to the failure or inaccessibility of the central control computer. Self-diagnosis and
automatic technician alert capabilities could better assure rapid service in urgent situations. Pubic
dissemination of weather and traffic conditions in the CAWS area via the Internet could extend the driver
information function of the system. These features, mostly requiring only software upgrades, may be
reasonably expected to enhance system effectiveness and possibly improve driver confidence in the system
and therefore compliance.
Fewer than half of the weather instruments at each of the nine remote weather stations are used by the CAWS.
The others currently serve no function other than remote data logging, and due to the proximity of the stations,
this collection of weather stations may represent one of the most redundant weather monitoring facilities in the
state. Yet, these instruments present the possibility of much more advanced driver information strategies, for
example, the prediction of the approach of fog banks using the anemometer and wind direction sensor along
with the visibility sensors, prediction of the formation of fog based upon temperature and dew point trends.
Integrated with driver information services and warning networks in other areas, the advanced warning of driers
before they decide to start through an area the will soon become foggy may be as great a safety enhancement
as advising drivers already in the fog.
Finally, as a research facility, the CAWS and the CAWS Evaluation System already in place provides a unique
opportunity to continue to study driver behavior, especially in fog, and the relationship between traffic
characteristics and collisions. The CAWS clearly has untapped potential as a test bed as well as an
operational safety enhancement.

1.12 Problems
Problem encountered during the course of this evaluation are listed and discussed in chronological order in the
following “Implementation Schedule”.
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1.13 Implementation Schedule
We present here the schedule of major evaluation activities and events as they actually occurred during the
course of the study. Problems, both technical and institutional, encountered during the course of this study are
described in chronological order.
September 22, 2000
Authorization to start work on evaluation project contract. Actual start of work on October 1, 2000.
October 17, 2000
Preliminary CAWS Evaluation meeting at Loragen Corp. with District 10 electrical systems chief.
November 2, 2000
Project kickoff meeting at Caltrans District 10 offices. Presented CAWS evaluation Technical Update and
discussed evaluation objectives and methodologies. Electrical Branch Chief Clint Gregory identified as primary
District contact for evaluation team. Four levels of evaluation presented. Electrical engineer Veronica
Cipponeri is responsible for day-to-day operation of CAWS system. James Collins introduced as field technical
support.
Discussed possible means to access the system for data collection purposes. Issue of external access
limitations identified. No internet connections or phone modem access in District 10 TMC.
December 31, 2000
First quarterly progress reported submitted. Concluded that it would not be possible to collect field data using a
single server located in the District 10 TMC. Need to install individual filed data acquisition systems identified.
Architecture for a distributed three-site monitoring system specified. Reviewed results of preliminary literature
on evaluation methods used for similar projects worldwide. Presented updated workplan based on new
technical approach. Field data collection expected to start Fall of 2001.
February 2, 2001
Meeting in District 10 with Gregory and Cipponeri. First access to printed output of the Signview activation log.
Unfortunately, it can only be displayed and printed one page at a time by the Signview program since it is in a
proprietary format. Discussed ways to remotely access the Signview computer, but no solution identified.
District felt it would be possible to get internet access to the Signview computer on the internet, but long
approval process lay ahead. If this doesn't work out soon enough, they'll provide physical access to the
archived data, which is stored periodically to Iomega Jazz drive tapes.
French Camp Slough control site isn’t powered, and this is needed to use it for evaluation data collection.
Visited field sites to trace lines, possible communications and power sources. Site selection for CCTV
monitoring cameras.
March 31, 2001
Technical meeting at D10 Office and work at field sites on I-5. Work on phone-line communications at
Mathews Road and the CMS site. Work on detector issues at all sites. Reviewed potential communications
solutions with District engineering staff.
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Presented methodology for assessment of driver response to CMS message based on work of Pirkko Rama,
from "Effects of Weather-Controlled Variable Speed Limits and Warning Signs on Driver Behavior",
Transportation Research Record, from Nov. 1999.
Completed preliminary data collection from TASAS and other sources in support of collision data analysis.
Began work on CAWS weather server to be located in the District 10 TMS, to assist Caltrans with
dissemination of information from the CAWS.
June 5, 2001
Released report on “Field Data Acquisition and Communications Systems” with detailed plans for all field data
acquisition field components, central server, and surveillance cameras.
July 1 2001
Request by District that we provide a preliminary report on collision data before and after the installation of the
CAWS.
July 23, 2001
Approved engineering plan for field data collection released in Quarter Report 3. Included detailed software
specifications for monitoring, remote access, secure communications, and autonomous operation of equipment
installed at each of the field sites in District 10. Video surveillance via internet-based network cameras
specified.
Proposed statistical model-based accident data analysis to better isolate CAWS effect from other influences on
traffic collisions.
Continued to work with District and Pac Bell to obtain communications with field data acquisition systems.
August 22, 2001
Field work – recorded weather system and Signview communications protocols at field sites so that we could
reverse-engineer these to monitor CAWS communications with these field elements.
Released “Field Inspection Report” by email on CAWS system and progress in monitoring traffic, weather and
CMS status.
September 1, 2001
Subcontract to Innovative Concepts for development of communications and data acquisition software to our
specifications.
October 6, 2001
Traced inability to run a phone line to the French Camp Slough Count station to the lack of a short conduit
between the Caltrans and PacBell demarcation boxes on French Camp Road. This is a jurisdictional matter as
well as a resource issue. Changed plan to wireless CDPD modem communications for this site. Joel Retanan
of Caltrans New Tech assisted our understanding of behavior of Signview software.
Transportation Engineer Kimberley Mastako hired to lead accident data analysis effort in progress.
Announced that lack of communications to field sites and not-yet-determined protocols for visibility detectors,
CMS communications, and will delay start of data acquisition for 2001-2002 fog season.
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October 11, 2001
Equipment was installed at French Camp Slough and Matthews Road. The CDPD modem and antenna was
installed at French Camp Slough, although protocol problems prevented establishing communications at that
time. The phone circuit at Matthews Road had not yet been activated. Video equipment was delivered to
District 10.
October 18, 2001
Equipment at French Camp CMS installed, including the video monitoring equipment
November 13, 2001
Report “Explanation of reduced expenditure rate, FY 1 and 2 “ provided at request of OTS. Described technical
and institutional issues that delayed start of data collection.
November 29, 2001
Field data acquisition fully operational at French Camp Slough, CMS 1 and Mathews Road sites. Noticed
unusual speed measurements from loops at French Camp Slough site.
December 12, 2001
Diagnostic work to get to bottom of speed measurement problems at French Camp Slough. Analog monitored
and recorded outputs of detector cards. Investigated problems related to floating grounds and noise on
communications and detector lines.
December 27, 2001
Activated real-time CAWS Evaluation web pages on Internet, showing data real time speeds, volumes and
camera images from all field sites: http://caws-evaluation.loragen.com
On January 2, 2002
Secured services of Inductive Signature Technologies of Tennessee to diagnose loop detector problem at
French Camp Slough, and calibrate detectors at Matthews Road. Installed experimental advanced detector
cards to replace the standard Caltrans Model 222 cards. Recorded inductive traces from each loop. Traced
wires in conduits. Also engineered and installed a new interface circuit with much greater immunity to possible
EM noise in the cabinet.
A LIDAR gun was used to test and calibrate speed sensing at Matthews Road.
January 12, 2002
Principal Investigator attended the 2002 Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting in Washington DC;
met with evaluators from similar projects.
January 22, 2002
Contract closure meeting with Innovative Concepts. Software/hardware not completed. Remedial plan worked
out.
January 31, 2002
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Delivered preliminary accident analysis report requested by District. This report studied accident statistics and
records in and around the study area for a period of 4 years prior to and 4 years after system activation. The
report was transmitted as an “Agency Confidential” draft document, subject to agency approval.
February 1, 2002
Began work on Linux-based central database server for evaluation, to replace problem-ridden Windows-2000
based server provided by Innovative Concepts.
February 7, 2002
Meeting in District office to finalize requirements and interfaces for CAWS Weather Server in TMC.
Further diagnostic work at French Camp Slough. Replaced IST 222 cards with regular GP6 cards. Found an
old as-built diagram for French Camp Slough, which confirmed suspicions of the presence of two sets of trailing
loops, long since paved over.
February 25, 2002
Principal Investigator participated in the “Fog Forum II” meeting, hosted by Caltrans District 10. Made two
presentations: the first summarizing the status of the CAWS evaluation projects, and the second a
comprehensive review of all other automated driver warning systems in the world, and any available evaluation
results reported for each.
February 28, 2002
Decommissioned Windows-2000 based central server. Switched to new Linux server. No problems.
Determined from recorded inductive traces that trailing loops at the French Camp Slough site must be
connected in series, which probably never showed up in count data when this site was used as a count station.
Emailed report of possible reasons for loop problems. Loops at other CAWS sites may be similarly affected.
March 14, 2002
th

Completed and delivered report requested by Caltrans operations on 85 percentile speed data for traffic
flowing through the study area parametric with visibility. We generated this analysis from data acquired at the
Mathews Road site.
Conference call with District personnel and IST engineers to discuss loop detector accuracy problems.
March 18, 2002
Meeting with Robert Spradling at District Office to discuss requirements for installing the D10 weather web
server in the TMC.
March 21, 2002
Found source of problem at French Camp Slough was undocumented series connection of old and new loops
together in junction box. Corrected the situation by isolating loops. Since old (unknown) loops were in better
conditions than new ones, so we utilized mix of loops separated by 36 feet for speed measurements. Also
installed 3 updated IST 222 cards at French Camp Slough.
March 29, 2002
LIDAR gun calibration of French Camp Slough loop detectors.
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April 14, 2002
Lane 3 detector at French Camp Slough failed.
April 15, 2002
Updated work plan to accommodate delay of data collection to 2002-2003 fog season.
April 18, 2002
Replaced IST 222 card from lane 3, which corrected the detector problem. Loop detectors finally fully
operational at French Camp Slough.
Updated CAWS evaluation website, and added CMS-character recognition feature.
May 17, 2002
Formal response to Caltrans comments on Preliminary Report on Accident Data.
Work in progress on follow-up report incorporating results of specific additions requested in Caltrans
comments, e.g., an analysis of secondary accidents.
July 1, 2002
Hired Melanie Benabides to continue work on accident analysis, addressing all Caltrans comments and
concerns. Hired Chris Ackles as senior engineer on evaluation project.
July 30, 2002
Data collection stable at all field sites. Collecting baseline data from summer.
August 9, 2002
Additional comments on preliminary accident analysis received from District and responded to. Preliminary
results of secondary accident analysis reported.
August 15, 2002
Preliminary accident analysis report review completed by Fred Rooney of Caltrans Traffic Operations. Provided
prior 1969 Caltrans unpublished report confirming similar findings.
October 18, 2002
A truck hit a CMS sign located on Northbound I-5, intermediate between the French Camp Slough and CMS
monitoring sites. The impact caused a loss of electrical power to all sites of our study until December 15, 2002.
This eliminated the most important period of this fog season.
November 1, 2002
Intermittent leased line communications becoming a major problem at Mathews Road. Unknown cause.
Continued to plague this site until December 19, when problem was traced to lack of a common ground for
telephone cable.
November 15, 2002 (estimated)
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At about this time, grading and paving work was done to create an additional high-speed access lane at the
French Camp Slough site. As a result of this construction work, the pull-boxes connecting the loop detectors at
this site were destroyed. Connections to all loops in two of the three lanes at French Camp Slough were lost
permanently. Date is approximate since no power to the site during this period. Problem was initially thought
to not be severe, and cut loop cables were reconnected as well as techs could figure out. Since power was
down, we couldn’t verify it these were reconnected correctly or not.
December 15, 2002
Power restored at French Camp Slough site.
December 16, 2002
Formal response and updated accident analysis report provided to Caltrans on accident analysis.
December 21, 2002
Revision 2 “Preliminary Evaluation of Traffic Safety Impacts of the Caltrans District 10 Automated Warning
System (CAWS) based Upon Accident Data” completed and selectively released for review by District 10
personnel. Contained updated results of all analyses and requested secondary accident and cross peak traffic
accident analyses.
December 19, 2002
Communications problem at Mathews Road traced to the apparently standard practice of not connecting the
telephone cable ground to the cabinet ground. This created a ground loop which caused noisy
communications, which became worse under wet conditions. Same situation was found at other CAWS sites,
suggesting that this problem may be at the root of intermittent communications problems with some CAWS
traffic or weather monitoring stations. Reported this finding to district technical personnel.
January 9, 2003
Definitively determined from loop data at French Camp Slough that loops had been reconnected incorrectly.
Learned that since original loop connections had been destroyed beyond repair, cables had been reconnected
to remaining available loops, some in the wrong lane.
January 21, 2003
Trip to field sites to survey damage to loops at French Camp Slough, and check if any possible reconnection
strategy could give use speed data.
Problem with data acquisition computer at CMS site – condensation in cabinet caused failure of motherboard.
Replace computer.
Visibility sensor a Mathews Road, down for previous three weeks, repaired by district personnel but still
reporting incorrect data. Problem ultimately determined to require replacement of PCB in Qualimetrics visibility
sensor in April. Visibility data at CAWS weather Station 1 unreliable until then.
January 24, 2003
Noticed from CMS monitoring data that the CAWS warning messages for fog had been changed to specific 45
and 30 mph speed advisories. Called and confirmed this with Clint Gregory.
January 30, 2003
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New motherboards for all field computers out of concern for condensation damage.
February 23, 2003
Brought up redesigned CAWS evaluation to http://caws-evaluation.loragen which allowed images to be
searched and downloaded more easily.
March 20, 2003
Site engineering survey at French Camp Slough to replace destroyed loops. Total of 12 loops were found at
the site at irregular spacing and with undocumented connections in pull boxes. Exact physical location of loops
remains unknown due to prior over-paving.
March 30, 2003
CAWS weather server in TMC stopped reporting updated weather data by highway segment. Problem was
traced to the clock drift between CAWS weather server and QCMS computer (part of the CAWS control
system). At some pint, the server treats the weather data as to old to be displayed, even though data is
current. Lack of a mechanism for time synching the CAWS computers identified as an operational problem,
not just a problem for matching the log files of each system.
While in TMC, found suspected email-borne virus in District Intranet computers (inside firewall). Possible
ramifications for CAWS weather server which, but no effect on CAWS itself since they are not networked.
Upgraded network cameras at CMS site, including taller pole, improved condensation and dust-free
enclosures.
April 5, 2003
Purchased and shipped replacement PCB for Qualmetrics visibility sensor at Mathews Road (CAWS Weather
Station 1). District installed and re-calibrated sensor a few days later. Visibility detection at WS 1 operational
again.
April 8, 2003
French Camp CMS and Mathew's Road sites both down. Problem eventually traced to power outage effecting
I-5, lasting two days.
April 15, 2003
Pac Bell communications problems affecting all CAWS leased lines in area, including our CMS and Mathews
Road sites. Problem lasts for three weeks until resolved after meeting by James Collins with PAC Bell.
April 22, 2003
All CAWS Traffic monitoring stations that were down due to phone company problems are said to be back on
line.
April 23, 2003
Visibility sensor at French Camp Slough fails. Problem attributed to PCB. New visibility car purchased by
Loragen and installed by District at French Camp Slough site.
April 25, 2003
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Lost communications with phone-line connected test sites (Mathews Road and CMS). Problem traced to cutoff of service without warning by IVWnet, the local ISP.
April 28, 2003
Transition to CDPD modems at southern two sites (French Camp CMS and Mathews Rd) due to continued
unreliability of lease-phone-line based field communications.
May 2, 2003
Status report on Loops at French Camp Slough site, communications, and access to Weather Server for
CAWS web site update.
May 5, 2003
Visibility sensor at French Camp Slough still not operational after PCB replacement. District technician
indicates that sensor has been installed and is working, but has not been calibrated.
May 22-30, 2003
Loragen proposes to District two additional test sites, one before and one after CMS, to assure redundancy in
view of number of calamities which plagued the test bed during the previous fog season. Dialog with District
regarding obtaining to construction records during the test period, loop replacements and cost, visibility board
calibration for French Camp Slough, 802-11 modems wireless field network to be installed by District, time
drifting of CAWS system vs isolated CAWS Weather Server in the TMC.
June 4, 2003
Final decision to replace all phone communications with CDPD modem service, which has proven to be much
more relatable than land-based phone lines and ISPs. Concern about planned termination of CDPD services
by AT&T.
June 15, 2005
Received no-cost project extension of two years, through June 30, 2005, to assure that we acquire complete
data over two full fog seasons.
June 27, 2003
Unable to NTP time synch CAWS weather server through District firewall. Change in VPN security settings
eventually found to be the problem.
June 30, 2003
CDPD modems and services activated for installation later at two field sites.
Jul 1, 2003
New loops installed by Caltrans at French Camp Slough in all lanes.
Colin Bortner hired to support evaluation needs in District 10 office.
July 2-4, 2003
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Installation of wireless CDPD modems and redundant communications software at CMS and Mathews Road
sites. Noted that communication at these sites still intermittent due to unreliable leased lines services. This
problem continues to affect CAWS as well as the evaluation test sites.
July 7, 2003
Meeting at District 10 Office. Reduction of construction record data and possible means to gain access to the
CAWS web site in the TMC for maintenance and upgrade purposes (VPN client, collocation of server at
Loragen, direct dial-up modem access, or access through D4 were discussed).
Identified proposed exact locations of two supplemental field station: Downing Road, just north of the French
Camp Slough site, and CAWS Speed Detection Station 1B approximately 0.6 mile south of the Mathews road
site).
Received raw text printout (over 1000 pages) of all construction encroachment permits issued on I5 and SR120
over the 10-year study period. Began sorting through this information manually and obtaining information
pertinent to the CAWS area.
July 18, 2003
CDPD modem problems required re-installation at FCS and Mathews Road sites. Upgraded OS at all sites.
CAWS Weather Server data backed up in D10 TMC.
July 22, 2003
CAWS Weather Server manual written for D10 staff use. Document explains how to periodically back up data
and troubleshoot.
August 20, 2003
Started construction of equipment for two additional evaluation test sites.
August 21, 2003
Problems with surveillance Netcams. We worked with manufacturer (StarDot Technology) to fix the problem
remotely, but were not successful. Ordered replacement camera.
August 27-29, 2003
Replaced defective camera at CMS monitoring site. New installation of loops at French Camp Slough was
inspected and traced. Loop separation and positions were incorrect, but can probably be compensated for in
software.
September 13-14, 2003
Installation of loop detectors at new site at Downing Road. PI present during 4:00 AM lane closure to observe
and check dimensions. Serviced CAWS weather server. Identified problem of loss of communications from all
CAWS weather stations, traced to phone company.
September 15, 2003
Visibility sensor at French Camp Slough repaired and calibrated by All-Weather tech rep, after extensive
negotiation with All-Weather.
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New loops re-wired in at French Camp Slough to fix cross-talk. Problem with loop pair in lane two at Mathews
Road repaired by installation and proper tuning of new 222 card.
October 1, 2003
Start of 2003-04 fog season, considered critical for this evaluation since prior two season were lost.
Field cabinets with card racks for 222 loop detector cards were installed by Caltrans district 10 personnel at the
new data acquisition sites at Downing Road and El Dorado Overcrossing (Loop detector site 1B). Loops
installed Sept 13-14 were connected to these field cabinets. Loop detector inaccuracy problems at all sites
found to be related to excessively high sensitivity setting used as Caltrans standard practice.
Communications problems with all CAWS weather stations discovered Sept 13 finally resolved by the phone
company (Pacific Bell).
October 9-10, 2003
Installation of data acquisition and communications equipment at Downing Ave and El Dorado Overcrossing.
October 13-17, 2003
Modified CAWS web page to include the two new field sites.
October 21, 2003
First of a series of problems with CDPD modem service: high latency times when communicating with the El
Dorado Overcrossing Site. Installed high-gain cellular antenna at site on advise of Airlink Communications.
October 24, 2003
Problems with traffic speeds reported by French Camp Slough site in Lane 1. Problem eventually traced to
poor connections to the 222 detector cards in the cabinet, possibly a result of the new loop installation work.
October 31, 2003
Power outage in study area. Field systems shut down gracefully after expending battery backup time at all
sites, then restarted successfully following restoration of power.
November 1-15, 2003
Developed and deployed custom software to more reliably handle intermittent power outages than utilities
provided by UPS manufacturer.
November 15, 2003
Occlusion of CMS monitoring camera due to rain, spider web and road debris accumulation. Periodic
maintenance schedule established for cameras.
November 23-25, 2003
Loss of communications at Downing Road site. Entire system unit replaced since problem was found to be
due to a faulty hard disk controller.
December 2, 2003
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Image records in our database indicated that CAWS system activated CMS 1 several times for severe weather,
but our CMS activation database showed no record of this. Image database for November 17 showed
retrofitting work being done on CMS (changed from incandescent to LED display) by Caltrans, which required
shutdown of power at that site. Evaluation system continued to operate on UPS power, but when the site was
re-powered, it no could monitor communications from 170/CMS controller. Ultimately, problem fixed by remote
restart of the CMS monitoring process.
Requested ATMS/Signview records during this period, so that we may manually update our database. Since
these records are only readable a page at a time on the Signview and TMS computers, printing of records for
periods more than a few days require a lot of work by District personnel. Recognized the need for a utility to
translate Signview and TMS log files into text readable format as aid to District as well as our operational
assessment.
December 12, 2003
Veronica reports all CAWS speed monitoring and weather stations south of Mathew's road are down due to
unknown causes. Our systems, on CDPD modems, continue to operate. CAWS problem traced to phone
connectivity rather than power outage, and CAWS sites remained functional, but not communicating with TMC.
Problem eventually traced to telecom hardware failure in TMC.
December 18, 2003
Visibility marks placed at specific distances from our traffic monitoring camera for verification of visibility
distance reported by sensors.
January 1, 2004
Ed Sullivan, James Daly, and additional student assistants were employed to extend and complete the analysis
of external factors that may have contributed to accident statistics in the CAWS, a project started by Melanie
Benebides and Kimberley Mastako.
January 2, 2004
Qualimetrics weather computer receives framing errors for several hours when attempting to acquire data from
the weather stations. Analysis of event lead to discovery that weather alarm flags maintain their present state
during communication outages with weather stations leaving old warning messages up until communications
re-established.
January 11, 2004
Incident in dense fog occurred. Analysis of data lead to first concerns about the CAWS control strategy.
January 21, 2004
14-hour period of severe fog period. CMS activated correctly and data collected by all our instrumentation.
First complete record of operation of system with all five sites fully operational to support driver behavior
analysis.
January 29, 2004
Received official VPN client configuration document and Cisco VPN software (bundled with hard-coded
configuration for Caltrans NorCal VPN access point). Setup of VPN access to our CAWS weather server in
TMC.
February 17, 2004
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Meeting in Sacramento to obtain access to Signview and TMS software source code, so that we could
investigate reasons for operational problems we were observing from our instrumentation and from samples of
logs from these systems provided by District. We are permitted to view but not copy Signview source code on
a notebook computer. Presented an update on the evaluation project for DRI personnel and justified our need
for access to CAWS source code to identify details of control strategy and to permit us to read Signview log
files.
February 19, 2004
VPN connection successfully established with District 10 TMC. Now able to remotely access and update
software on our CAWS weather intranet server computer.
February 23, 2004
Andrew Lee successfully negotiates access to Signview and TMS source code for us. We receive, sign and
return a non-disclosure agreement provided by Caltrans Operations.
February 25, 2004
Observed rain and high-wind conditions. Mathews Road CMS automatically activated “Gusty Wind Warning”
message. This is a relatively rare condition, involving a trigger other than fog or traffic.
February 27, 2004
Received archived logs generated by the TMS, weather monitoring, and Signview computers between August
2003 and December 2003.
March 4, 2004
Caltrans authorization signatures obtained on non-disclosure agreement for source code access. We receive
TMS and Signview source code. Work begins on study of source code to attempt to understand the CMS
activation control strategy and to determine means to read the Signview and TMS log files (weather monitoring
system log files are already plain text).
March 5, 2004
Received archived logs generated by the TMS, weather monitoring, and Signview computers from December
2003 to the end of February 2004. Started development of computer utilities to decode these, now that we had
the Signview and TMS program source code to allow us to reverse-engineer the encoding scheme.
March 8, 2004
Downing Rd. site was no longer reporting data to the CAWS Evaluation Server. Problem found to be a power
outage that lasted longer than the UPS battery life on 3/6/2004. Concluded that power might have been
temporarily shut off during roadway construction.
March 12, 2004
Sent email to Signview program primary author Celso Izquierdo, at Caltrans HQ. Requested clarification of
Signview’s 88:88 message timeouts and blank messages, and lack of sign blanking commands in Signview
logs.
March 19, 2004
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CHP information officers in Stockton and Manteca offices will provide accident data during the 2003-04 fog
season, not yet available in the TASAS database, which is typically one year behind.
March 22, 2004
District CAWS personnel interviewed to best benefit from their knowledge and experience with the control
strategy of system, since no documentation available. Since Signview logs do not record times that messages
are turned off, we work out strategies to infer this from other logs and events.
Need for access to SV170 source code is recognized to resolve some unusual system response observations,
and we began the approval process.
March 23, 2004
Another extended power outage event occurred at the Downing Rd. beyond the UPS keep-alive capacity.
Problems with traffic speeds reported at the French Camp Slough site in Lane 1. Found to be due to problem
with the 222 back-plane in cabinet. Replaced PC-interface device anyway.
March 24, 2004
Request for access to SV170 source code not permitted for security reasons.
March 25, 2004
Email to Clint Gregory requesting a meeting to go over data that seemed to indicate possible problems with
CAWS.
March 26, 2004
Problem with 222 detector card at Mathews Road sites traced to new card being set to pulse mode for lane 1
(should be set to presence mode). Cards at all sites swapped out and replaced with a Sarasota GP6C cards
for consistency. Detector sensitivity settings corrected.
March 30, 2004
Phone meeting with District to discuss data indicative of possible problems with CAWS control strategy.
March 31, 2004
Received raw traffic accident records from CHP for recent accidents near the I-5/SR120 Y in support of
accident data analysis.
April 21, 2004
Presented “Preliminary Observations from Available Data” at meeting at District office with Caltrans District and
DRI personnel.
July 12, 2004:
Loragen proposes to take responsibility for fixing two of the operational issues cited: problem of time synch and
inability of Signview to log times that messages are turned off. These problems do not effect actual operation of
CAWS, but make evaluation much more difficult.
District OK’s work on the logging problem, but plans a network solution to time synch of CAWS computers.
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July 14, 2004:
Search begins for original complier used for Signview, so that any change we make would not effect any
subtleties of the previous compiled binary. District and DRI assist but version provided is incorrect. It was
necessary to purchase (from E-bay) and test several early-90’s versions of Borland Turbo C to find the actual
version used, by comparison of complied binary files with existing CAWS binaries. Version eventually
identified as Borland Turbo C++ 3.00 on August 16.
July 19, 2004
We ask Clint if he had received the Turbo C compiler from Joel and request that he sends down the CD when
he receives it. We ask whom we should contact about the source code change to add logging of automatic
blanking messages to Signview. We volunteer to assist with the network time synchronization solution.
July 30, 2004
Developed Potential Collision Speed (PCS) as a real-time metric of traffic safety especially suited to visibilitylimited situations. Applied this evaluation data and verified effectiveness and sensitivity to small changes in
traffic safety in fog. Originally normalized this value to the free speed and reported it as “Risk of Collision”
(ROC), but the acronym was later dropped.
August 4, 2004
Visibility sensor at CAWS weather station 1 reading erratically low compared with the sensor at French Camp
Slough.
August 19, 2004
District reports that a fix for the timing issue between the TMC computers would be in beta test by the end of
August.
Weather Station 1 (Mathews Road) visibility sensor recalibrated.
Loragen hires Jasmine Noriega to assist with support of evaluation in District 10 office.
August 23, 2004
VPN connection to the D10 weather computer discontinued due to change in Caltrans security policy.
August 24, 2004
We noticed that visibility seemed consistently higher at Weather Station 1 (Mathews Road) when compared to
French Camp Slough weather station. Eventually recalibrated which corrected problem, but concern over data
skew from past several months.
August 26, 2004
We send detailed instructions on the Signview source code change so that it will log automatic blanking
messages.
September 7, 2004
El Dorado Road down due to extended power outage. Corrected Sept 9.
September 9, 2004
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Joel Retanan makes source code changes to Signview and tests. CMS blanking messages now being logged.
New version designated Signview 3.12 in the TMC.
Loragen ships a new loop interface device for installation on Monday morning (9/13) in case this has failed after
power outage at El Dorado site.
September 13, 2004
Veronica informs us that the Weather stations are not reporting to the TMC. Problem is was cured later that
day by manually resetting weather station 3.
Jasmine installs a new loop interface device at the El Dorado speed site. Work was preventative maintenance
only, since system was already operating correctly for the previous three days.
Loragen requests permission to videotape traffic in the Mossdale Y section to better understand the traffic and
system response apparent from data logs.
September 16, 2004
District expresses concerns about videotaping on highway based on safety, legal issues and relevance to
study. Permit would be needed with California Film Commission. Discussion of request continues for several
weeks.
September 23, 2004
James Collins (primary CAWS field support person) no longer at District 10 due to lack of resources.
September 30, 2004
Waiver obtained from California Film Commission to videotape traffic on highway for scientific purposes.
October 2, 2004
Installed two additional remote network cameras to observe visibility and traffic conditions at French Camp
Slough and Mathews Road, have been added to the CAWS evaluation web site. Installed a third temporary
camera on tower at Weather Station 9 with a view of the Mossdale “Y”.
Installed precision time reference cards in all CAWS computers (under supervision of District personnel) to
assure time synchronization.
Replaced a hard disk at Downing Road site and got to the root of it’s persistent failure problem – water
accumulation in the cabinet due to roadway runoff.
October 15, 2004
Secured commitments from original external advisory panel: Dominique Lord of Texas A&M, James Moore of
USC, Bob Layton of Oregon State University, Richard McGinnis of Bucknell University. We are also in the
process of selecting a Caltrans internal expert on safety to serve as a primary data reviewer.
November 1, 2004
Began final report. Defined 5 Sections corresponding to each evaluation task and a summary section.
December 20, 2004
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Completed work on the multivariate regression accident analysis, for data available up to the present fog
season.
January 12, 2005
PI attended the 2005 TRB Annual Meeting in Washington DC, and presented a paper “Methods and Metrics of
Evaluation of an Automated Real-time Driver Warning System”.
At TRB meeting met with Richard Van der Horst, the principal evaluator of the Roadway Safety Enhancement
System of the Drive II project. Also, met with members of the external advisory board, which was appointed to
provide an outside independent review of the evaluation methods and results.
February 8, 2005
District 10 move of TMC to new building delays response to our request for copies of the CAWS log files from
2004, required for our assessment of the system operation.
February 12, 2005
Lost contact with the network camera at Weather Station 9 (Mossdale Y). No reason determined.
February 20, 2005
Severity of the CAWS response lag became apparent from analysis of data: delays between 3 and 18 minutes
for fog activations, with mean delay over 7 minutes. 3-6 minute delays typical for traffic activations For some
fog activations, the fog peak is missed completely. Reported observations in Quarter report.
Observed that speed standard deviation changes very little under any conditions, contrary to report from some
other studies.
March 1, 2005
We have begun the process of transitioning the operation of the CAWS evaluation system to Caltrans
responsibility, including preparation of detailed Operators Manual.
April 12, 2005
Delivered CAWS “Evaluation System Operators Manual” to Caltrans District 10.
April 26, 2005
National Visibility Web Conference presentation by Clint Gregory of District 10.
May 27, 2005
Evaluation System Handoff meeting. Delivery of CAWS Evaluation Server, all software and documentation to
Caltrans District 10. Setup in TMC but not Internet connection yet so not possible to get operational. We
agreed to maintain a backup transition server and wireless contracts for District until July 1, to avoid any data
loss.
June 1, 2005
Plan approved for completion of complete Evaluation Report over summer, with final report to be delivered at
end of summer. Work on final report entire focus.
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June 30, 2005
Contract end.
July 1, 2005
CDPD wireless services end. No more contact with evaluation data acquisition systems in the field, although
data will be retained on systems to capacity of hard disks, estimated to last at least two months.
August 1 – September 11, 2005
Incremental delivery of five volumes of Project Final Report.
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1.14 Documentation
The documentation section of this report is comprised of four subsequent volumes, each a complete report on
one of the tasks under this evaluation contract. These contain all evaluation results and methodologies, and
documentation of all deliverables:
Analysis of Driver Response to CAWS Warning Messages

Vol. 2

Technical and Operational Assessment

Vol. 3

Evaluation of Traffic Safety Influence Based on Historical Collision Data

Vol. 4

Technical Deliverables

Vol. 5
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1.16 Appendix
1.16.1 Related reports, publications and presentations on companying CD:
Preliminary evaluation system design presentation, District 10, 1998
Project status presentation, District 10, 1002.
CAWS Evaluation Technical Update for Caltrans District 10, November 2, 2000
Caltrans HQ briefing, 2003
Caltrans/CHP Fog Forum, 2003
CAWS Evaluation Technical Update for Caltrans District 10, April 4, 2003
National Visibility Conference Presentation, Madison Wisconsin, 2003
Survey of fog warning and variable speed limit systems worldwide, Caltrans/CHP Fog Forum, 2001
CAWS Evaluation overview, Caltrans/CHP Fog Forum, 2001
“Methods and Metrics of Evaluation of an Automated Real-time Driver Warning System,” TRB 05-1423,
presented at Transportation Research Board annual meeting, January, 2005.

1.16.2 Bibliography – Additional Published Information on Similar Highway Fog Warning Systems
1.16.3 Verification of Completion of Contractual Tasks based on Contract Schedule A: Project
Description (OTS-38b)
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1.16.2 Bibliography – Additional Published Information on Similar Highway Fog Warning Systems
In addition to the literature citations in the five volumes of this report, the following bibliographic references may
be of some value for the further information of the reader of this report. Each contains the abstract if it was
available. The citations were accumulated early in the project, and may not necessarily represent the most
recently available information. The list is not comprehensive, but is representative. Cited foreign language
papers were limited to only those with English abstracts of sufficient detail to provide useful information on a
particular project. Publications are categorized by the location of the project, plus a general class for other
technology-based papers of direct relevance. In addition to these resources, extensive information is available
via the World Wide Web on individual products and traffic warning projects. Excerpts from selected references
appear in the Appendix.

1.16.2.1 Projects in USA
Arkansas
Highway Accident Report: Multiple Vehicle Collision With Fire During Fog Near Milepost 118 On
Interstate 40, Menifee, Arkansas, January 9, 1995 And Special Investigation Of Collision Warning
Technology
Source: National Transportation Safety Board, 800 Independence Avenue, SW, Federal Office Building
10A, Washington, DC, 20594
Report Number: NTSB/HAR-95/03,;Notation 6530A 105p
Publication Year: 1995
Language: English
Abstract: On January 9, 1995, a multiple-vehicle rear-end collision occurred during localized fog on
Interstate 40 near Menifee, Arkansas. The accident about 1:50 a.m. near milepost 118 eventually
involved eight loaded truck tractor semitrailer combinations and one light-duty van. Four drivers and a
co-driver were killed, one driver sustained a minor injury, and four drivers were uninjured. The safety
issues discussed in this report include collision warning technology use during low visibility driving
conditions, the emergency channel 9 override feature for citizens band radios, and the non-uniformity in
State laws governing four-way emergency hazard flasher operation. As a result of its investigation, the
Safety Board issued safety recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation; the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration; the Federal Communications Commission; the 50 States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Territories; the
Telecommunications Industry Association; the Intelligent Transportation Society of America; and the
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators.
California
“Changeable Message" Warning Signs In Dense Fog
Source: California Highway Patrol, P.O. Box 898, Analysis Section, Sacramento, CA, 95804
Via: National Safety Council, Safety Research Info Service, Intrm Report.
Publication Year: 1977
Language: English
Abstract: The California Highway patrol (CHP) and the Department of Transportation (Caltrans)
cooperated in the Fog Sign Study to determine the usefulness of "changeable message" warning signs
in dense fog. The study was conducted in Stockton Area on SR 99 south of Stockton and in Riverside
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Area on SR 91 near Corona. The time period for the study was December 1, 1976, through March
31, 1977. Five warning signs (48" x 48") with telescoping stand and strobe light were assigned to each
Area. Two cloth changeable messages were used: "DENSE FOG AHEAD" and "WRECK AHEAD".
These messages were attached to a basic sign by means of Velcro fasteners and could be easily
changed to meet operational needs. The signs were collapsible so they could fit in the trunk of the
patrol car. When there was an accident in light to heavy fog, the CHP patrol unit put up the warning
sign with the message, "WRECK AHEAD". To prevent potential chain reaction accidents, the other
warning sign with the message "DENSE FOG AHEAD" was put up whenever there was a fog bank
ahead of 200 feet or less visibility. The intent of the study was to determine what effect the warning
signs ("DENSE FOG AHEAD" and "WRECK AHEAD") hand on vehicle speed. Also, the
practicality and the usefulness of the signs were to be determined through comments made by CHP
Officers. Objective analysis could not be made because of lack of data. Speed surveys were not
conducted, and only eight "Warning Sign Evaluation Forms" were completed. It is recommended that
the usefulness and effectiveness of these fog signs be restudied during the 1977 fog season with
improvements.
Changeable Message Warning Signs In Dense Fog: Interim Report December 1, 1976 - March 31, 1977
Source: California Highway Patrol, Sacramento, CA,
Supplemental notes: California Highway Patrol, analysis section other phys.
Publication Year: 1977
Language: English
Data Source: UC, Berkeley, Institute for Transportation Studies
Abstract: No abstract.
Detectors for Automatic Fog-warning Signs
Author: Juergens, W. R.
Source: California. Division of highways. Sacramento.
Final report sponsored by the California Dept. of Transportation.
Research report No. CA-dDOT-tr-1115-1-73-02.
Publication year: 1973
Language: English
Data source: UC, Berkeley, Institute for Transportation Studies
Abstract: no abstract provided.
Florida
Evaluation Of Motorist Warning Systems For Fog-Related Incidents In The Tampa Bay Area
Author: Pietrzyk, MC; Turner, PA; Geahr, SL; Apparaju, R
Source: Center for Urban Transportation Research, University of South Florida, 4202 East Fowler Avenue,
Tampa, FL, 33620, and Florida Department of Transportation, 605 Suwannee Street, Tallahassee, FL,
32399-0450
Report Number: ESC-DOT-96/97-7007-TO
Publication Year: 1997
Language: English
Abstract: A four-month investigation was conducted to determine (1) the extent of unique and
recurring patterns of fog and fog-related incidents in the Tampa Bay area (defined as Hillsborough and
Pinellas counties) and (2) suitable countermeasures to detect and warn motorists of fog conditions. The
results of this investigation are summarized as follows: The Tampa Bay area typically has about 22
"heavy fog" days annually when visibility is 1/4 mi (0.4 km) or less. Comparatively, the foggiest
location in the U.S. is located at Cape Disappointment, Washington, with 106 heavy fog days per
year. Fog tends to form on clear, cool nights when moist air accumulates just above the ground or
water. Light winds mix this shallow air to form condensation, which dissipates as the sun rises. This
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condition generally tends to occur between December and February in the Tampa Bay area.
However, fog prediction is difficult because of the variability in density, location, development and
dissipation rates, and area of coverage at a given point in time. Only the typical "fog season" can be
identified. Between 1987 and 1995, 829 fog-related crashes were reported in the Tampa Bay area
and 6,323 statewide. This represents 0.30% and 0.32% of the total reported crashes in Tampa Bay
and the state, respectively. Crash report sites have been scattered throughout the Tampa Bay area,
and thus, historically, there have been no particular fog-prone crash locations. Over the last decade,
Hillsborough County has had a fog crash rate somewhat above the state average, while Pinellas
County's fog crash rate has been well below the state's average. Hillsborough County has never been
ranked higher than 16th, and Pinellas County has not ranked higher than 47th among all 67 Florida
counties over this same period of time. Those drivers who are most likely to be involved in fog-related
crashes in the Tampa Bay area are residents of the county where the crash occurs, driving passenger
cars, age 20-29, driving during the a.m. commute hours and traveling on local and county roads in
rural locations. About 12 states have been formally engaged in detection and warning system
evaluation related to fog, and several have invested $2-$4 million for integrated visibility/weather and
motorist warning systems. However, the benefits for deployment of such systems have not been
documented. Even though a recurring theme in all fog crash evaluations conducted by the states and
National Transportation Safety Board recommends the development of a driver awareness campaign
(to assure driver behavior is uniform in times of limited visibility), only California has followed through
in this endeavor. This report recommends and describes a focused driver awareness campaign as the
most cost-effective measure to reduce fog-related crashes, since the Tampa Bay area exhibits no
particular fog-prone or fog-crash-prone areas. This awareness campaign should share information
related to the fog season, fog crash history, and driving tips in fog.
Georgia
Fog Detection and Warning System
Published on web site: www.dot.state.ga.us/homeoffs/fpmr.www/admin/research/fog.html
Source: Georgia Dept. of Transportation, Research and Development Division
Publication Year: 1999
Language: English
Abstract: One of Research and Development's most innovative contributions has been the installation of
a Fog Detection Warning System on a heavily-traveled portion of Interstate 75 in South Georgia. The
system, developed jointly by GDOT and the Georgia Tech Research Institute, could serve as a prototype
for automated visibility monitoring programs in other states where fog, snow or dust can pose hazards for
motorists. Using a network of 19 sensors, 5 sets of traffic speed monitoring loops, weather instruments
and an on-site central computer, the system will continuously monitor visibility and control four variable
message signs along a 12 mile section of highway in an area where dense fog is known to develop. When
the system detects a visibility problem, it will automatically notify authorities by telephone and post
information on the variable message signs. The signs, in turn, will warn drivers of the specific hazard, call
for reduced traffic speeds when appropriate, and provide detour information if necessary. Messages are
changed automatically, by the system, or on-site by an official. A dial-up system provides law
enforcement and highway officials with remote access to the information gathered by the system. Using
computer terminals, these officials will be able to monitor visibility levels, traffic speeds, and weather
conditions. The fog warning system uses commercially available optical fog sensors, each of which
contains a light source and a receiver which are aligned at a slight angle to each other. Under good
conditions, the beam of light produced by the source will miss the receiver; however, the presence of fog
particles will scatter the beam and reflect light back into the receiver. The receiver then measures the
amount of light it is receiving and calculates the extent of visibility impairment. The study phase of this
project is expected to provide such basic information as how often fog occurs, how severe visibility
problems can become, and how widespread the problems can be. The study also includes measured
traffic speeds during various fog conditions and a comparison of the visibility sensor readings with human
observations. This information will be used to design the operational system.
North Carolina
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North Carolina Experimental Evaluation Project 170-3(5) Fog Detection and Warning Device
Author: Strong, MP
Source: North Carolina Department of Transportation, Planning and Research Branch,
P.O. Box 25201, Raleigh, NC, 27611
Final Report
Publication Year: 1985
Language: English
Bibliographic/Data Appendices: 1 App.
Abstract: The performance of the experimental fog detection and advisory speed warning system was
observed during a ten year period of operation. During this period, limited problems were experienced
with the power supply modules in the sign system, with the drive motor and roller mechanisms in the
sign scrolls, and with integrated circuit logic systems within the sign units. The highway accident
experience decreased when this fog detection and advisory speed warning system was converted to a
dual remote control and direct control mode of operation.
Oregon
Variable Message Fog Hazard Warning Signs To Control Vehicle Operating Characteristics
Source: Oregon Department of Transportation, State Highway Division, Salem , OR,
97310
Sponsored by FHWA.
Publication Year: 1972
Language: English
Data Source: National Safety Council, Safety Research Info Serv
Abstract: This project is aimed at determining the effectiveness of variable message signs in controlling
traffic on an Interstate highway during periods of hazardous driving conditions such as fog, vehicle
accidents or congestion. The effectiveness of the signs is being measured quantitatively by use of
accident records, vehicular speeds, and headways. Insufficient data preclude drawing quantitative
conclusions; however, based on data available, interviews with the State Police, and visual observation
of vehicular operations, it appears that the signs are effective in controlling traffic operations and
thereby preventing accidents during periods of reduced visibility due to fog.
Fog Warning Sign System
Author: George, L.E.
Source: ITTE, California University, Berkeley, /Proc, 2nd Ann Symposium, pp 23-24
Publication Date: Dec. 1969
Language: English
Abstract: A six-mile section of interstate 5 in Oregon located in the Willamette River valley, was found to
be extremely susceptible to radiation type fog forming conditions during certain periods of the
year. The conditions which bring about radiation fog are discussed. in early 1968, an extremely vicious
chain reaction accident precipitated a series of investigations and studies involving operating conditions on
this portion of the freeway as well as possible corrective measures. The general accident pattern in six
years preceding 1966, at which time a warning sign system was installed, consisted of a total of 13
accidents involving 129 vehicles. Seven fatalities and 73 injuries were sustained. Orange, diamondshape warning signs with battery-operated flashing lights fixed to the top of the post were installed in
1966. These signs were manually operated by state patrol men. Since manual sign activation was too
slow, the use was obtained of a remote telemeter control for six signs from the Albany office of the state
police. Twenty-four hour radio contact between police mobile units on the freeway and the Albany office is
used as an early warning system on which decisions are based to activate the signs if there is indications
of a critical fog. A research program is being developed to measure the effect of these signs on the traffic
stream operation.
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Variable Message Fog Hazard Warning Signs to Control Vehicle Operating Characteristics
Final rept. Nov 68-Jun 79
George, L. E. ; Hofstetter, D. K. ; Wagner, D. R.
Source: Oregon Dept. of Transportation, Salem. Traffic Engineering Section.
Sponsor: Federal Highway Administration, Salem, OR. Oregon Div.
Report Number: 79/3; FHWA/OR-79/3. See also report dated Apr 72, PB-210 205.
Publication Date: June 1979
Language: English
Abstract: The objective of the research project was to determine the effectiveness of a variable message
fog warning sign system on a 6.5 mile fog prone section of Interstate 5 in Oregon. Prior to installing this
variable message sign system in 1968, an intensive literature search was conducted to determine the
optimum signing system for our needs. It was determined that prior experience with this type of system
had not been adequately documented. Therefore, the 'Oregon Design' was developed, and this study
conducted to determine the system's effectiveness. The primary finding of this study was that the 'Oregon
Design' variable message fog warning sign system has been effective in reducing the number of fog
related accidents on this section of highway.
Variable Message Fog Hazard Warning Signs to Control Vehicle Operating Characteristics.
Source: Oregon State Highway Div., Interstate 5 - North Albany
Report Number: 5149-602-08 Contract Number: DOT-FHWA-41L4014; HPR-1(6)
Publication Date: April 1972
Abstract: The project is aimed at determining the effectiveness of variable message signs in controlling
traffic on an Interstate highway during periods of hazardous driving conditions such as fog, vehicle
accidents, or congestion. The effectiveness of the signs is measured quantitatively by use of accident
records, vehicular speeds, and headways. It appears that the signs are promising in preventing accidents
during periods of reduced visibility due to fog.
Tennessee
Fog Warning System Provides A Safety Net For Motorists
Author: Dahlinger, D; McCombs, B
Source: Public Works Journal Corporation, 200 South Broad Street, Ridgewood , NJ, 07451
Journal of Public Works Vol: 126 Issue Number: 13, pp 36-37 ISSN: 00333840
Publication Date: December 1995
Language: English
Abstract: Motorists on Interstate 75 in southeastern Tennessee now have the benefit of a fog
detection/warning system to keep them apprised of adverse highway conditions. The warning system
monitors conditions along a three-mile highway section that has a history of severe fogging events.
These conditions have resulted in several severe reduced visibility related crashes. The most recent
crash involved a total of 99 vehicles in December 1990, which resulted in 12 fatalities and 42 injuries.
The project was developed by a Tennessee Department of Transportation committee of public safety,
traffic operations, design, construction, and maintenance, and Federal Highway Administration
representatives.

Virginia
Fog Warning System To Be Installed On Virginia's Highway System At Critical Locations
Source: Journal of American Highways Vol 50, No 4, P 15
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Publication Date: Oct 1971
Language: English
Abstract: The first fog warning equipment on Virginia's state highway system will be installed at two
locations on interstate 64 in 1971. The detector on the sensing device, which was designed in Germany,
consists basically of a lamp and a light-sensitive tube with screens between them. Fog particles in the
atmosphere scatter toward the photocell some of the light that passes under the screens that
prevent a direct light-to-tube route. The Elizabeth river bridge installation involves both fog and ice
warnings. Two air and moisture sensors are used for the ice detector. One of the two is
heated to retain unfrozen moisture, through which a current is conducted. When the second sensor
freezes, the current is cut off, and this activates the message to the ice and speed signs. The speed
limit sign can be turned on manually also, and therefore can be used with either the ice or fog warnings, or
with both. The Elizabeth River bridge installation will be made at a cost of $68,735

1.16.2.2 Foreign Projects
England
Assessment Of M25 Automatic Fog-Warning System - Final Report
Author: Cooper, Br; Sawyer, HE
Source: Transport Research Laboratory, Old Wokingham Road, Crowthorne , Berkshire, Rg11 6au,
United Kingdom, TRL Project Report, Issue Number: PR 16, IRRD Document Number: 858269
Publication Year: 1993
Language: English
Abstract: An automatic fog warning system, designed by Traffic Control and Communications Division of
the Department of Transport, became operational during the summer of 1990 on the M25 London orbital
motorway. TRL were asked to assess the effectiveness of the system, primarily in terms of any changes in
vehicle speeds which occurred when the signals were switched on as a result of the formation of fog. This
report on the assessment describes briefly the automatic warning system, the method of data collection
and analysis and also presents detailed results. There is an overall net reduction in mean vehicle speeds,
of about 1.8 mph when the signals are switched on based on data from 6 test sites. Rather greater speed
reductions occur in lanes 2 and 3 and lesser ones in lane 1. Increases in speed occur when the signals
are switched off. Faster vehicles slow down more; it is estimated that the 85th percentile speed (i.e. the
speed exceeded b y only the fastest 15 percent of vehicles) falls by about 0.5 mph more than the
reduction in the mean when the signals are switched on. However, the potential of the automatic fog
warning system to reduce drivers' speeds is perhaps illustrated by the greatest average speed reduction
at a single test site of approximately 5 mph (recorded in lane 3). These speed reductions indicate that
drivers are alerted to the presence of fog ahead which coupled to the greater credibility associated with an
automatic system, means that drivers are likely t o respond more quickly to the hazard itself. In addition
operational benefits would be expected to accrue to the police. Control office staff are notified of the
presence of fog, but are relieved of the difficult task of operating motorway signals in response to fog
whose density and location is likely to be continuously changing. Furthermore, the mimic signal display in
the control office will tell the police which signals are showing the 'fog' legend and therefore where the fog
is.
Germany
Evaluation of an Automatic Fog-Warning System.
Author: Hogema, Jeroen H. et. al.
Source: Journal of Traffic Engineering & Control, pp. 629-632; Includes bibliographical references, Vol. 37,
no. 11 Publication Date: Nov.1996
Language: English
Data source: UC, Berkeley, Institute for Transportation Studies
Abstract: No abstract.
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Fog Warning: A Step Towards Automation In Accident Prevention
Author: Michaelis, E.E.
Source: Journal: Roads & Road Construction, London, UK, Vol 49, No 588, pp. 430-431
Publication Date: December 1971
Language: English
Abstract: Fog warning systems so far installed in Britain have proved of limited value because motorists
have found the arrangements under which these are switched on to be unreliable. The light obscuration
caused by fog at British airports is measured at three points along the runways using special
transmissometers. The ambient light is also measured using a background luminance monitor. The
transmissometer is not only highly accurate initially by maintains its accuracy over a long period of time
without requiring constant cleaning. Special housing insures that the instrument will remain operative
under the most severe weather conditions. The transmissometer has been used with dramatic
reduction of accidents on the Aachen-Cologne autobahn near a plant producing a severe and localized
fog.
Netherlands
The Dutch Fog-Detection And Warning Project
Author: Remeijn, H.
Affiliation: Ministry of Transport, Netherlands
Publisher: IEE , London, UK
Sixth International Conference on Road Traffic Monitoring and Control p. 89-93 ISBN: 0 85296 545 1
Publication Date: 28-30 April 1992.
Language: English
Abstract: Holland has known a number of severe motorway-accidents caused by fog. These accidents
have occurred on various places in the motorway network, but some roads have been plagued more than
others. The A16-motorway, the link between Rotterdam and Belgium, is more or less famous for its fog
accidents. In the beginning of 1991 the Ministry of Transport decided that a fog-detection and warningsystem should be installed at the A16 near Breda, and that this system would serve as a pilot project for
possible later installations. The system design of this pilot is presented. The control equipment is located
at a service site near Breda. All outstations are connected to the control equipment via a set of party-lines;
the visibility-sensors use wires in the same cable. A mini-computer is used to collect the visibility-data, to
control the outstations along the road and to communicate with a number of PC's via modems. One PC
(for system supervision) is situated in the control room of the Drechttunnel, because this location is
manned 24 hours a day. Another PC is used by the KNMI to collect meteorological research data. A (hot)
standby computer is foreseen but not operational yet.
Dutch Fog-Detection and -Warning Project.
Author: Remeijn, H.
Source: Ministry of Transport, Holland
IEE Conference Publication N 355, Michael Faraday House, Stevenage, Engl. P 89-93.
Publication Year: 1992
Language: English
Abstract: In response to a number of severe highway accidents caused by fog, the Ministry of Transport
in Holland installed a fog-detection and warning-system on the A16 near Breda. Drawing on the
experience of similar systems around Europe, project managers decided that the system should project a
maximum speed limit under bad visibility conditions. In addition, the speed used can vary from 100 km/h
to 20 km/h, with speeds lower than 60 km/h not having much effect. This paper describes the system and
its integration into the Motorway Control and Signaling System.
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Evaluation of an experimental fog detection and warning System on the A16 (Evaluatie
Proefistdetectie- En Waarschuwingssysteem Op De A16)
Author: Stoop, J
Source: Technische Universiteit Delft, Vakgroep Veiligheidskunde, Kanaalweg 2b, Delft, 2628 Eb,
Netherlands.
Publication Year: 1994
Language: Dutch
IRRD Document Number: 875909
Data Source: Transport Research Laboratory (TRL)
Abstract: An accident analysis has been made after the installation of an fog warning and fog
detection system on the A16 motorway. Complicated accidents have not occurred after the installation
and the number of other accidents have decreased, in particular the rear-end collisions. Other kinds of
accidents during fog can be decreased as far as the lower speed adds to the prevention of skidding
due to a slippery road. Besides the installation of the fog warning and fog detection system eventual
side effects have been studied such as coupling with the Automatic Incident Detection System and the
installation of another street lighting.
Spain
Automatic Fog Warning System
Author: Winstanley, J.V.
Affiliation: Plessey Systems Technol., Chessington, UK
Journal: Mundo Electronico (Spain), No.58 p. 39-44
Publication Date: Dec. 1976
Language: Spanish
Abstract: Fog on high-speed motorways can be a deadly and expensive menace. The article outlines an
automatic system of fog detection and gauging to allow appropriate accident preventive action to be taken.
Two separate optical sensors gauge the visibility level: a point visibility meter measures the fog density as
a light scattering function, and a back-ground light meter simulates the sensitivity of the human eye to
prevailing lighting conditions. The combined signals are transmitted to a control room for analysis and
display/alarm.

1.16.2.3 General Fog Warning Systems, Devices, and Driver Behavior Studies
Ice and Fog: Detection and Warning Systems. (Latest citations from the NTIS Database)
Source: National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA. NERAC, Inc., Tolland, CT.
Publication Date: July 1993
Language: English
Bibliography: Contains citations concerning detection methods and warning systems for sea ice,
aircraft ice, bridge ice, and fog formation. Remote aerial sensing and ground based detection systems
are among the methods discussed. (Contains 250 citations and includes a subject term index and title
list.)
Ice and Fog: Detection and Warning Systems (Citations from the NTIS Data Base)
A series of reports covering 4-year intervals from 1964-Feb 94.
Author/Editor: Habercom, G. E.
Source: National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA.
Publication Date: March 1980
Language: English
Abstract: Sea ice, aircraft ice, bridge ice, and fog formation detecting methods are reviewed in these
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Government-sponsored research reports. Remote aerial sensing and ground based detection systems
are among the methods investigated. (This updated bibliography contains 177 abstracts, 15 of which
are new entries to the previous edition.)
Fog Collision-Avoidance Warning Device
Author: de Bruyne, P.
Proceedings IEEE 31st Annual 1997 International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology,
Canberra, ACT, Australia, pp. 168-71 ISBN: 0 7803 3913 4
Publisher: IEEE , New York, NY, USA
Conference Date: 15-17 Oct. 1997
Language: English
Abstract: The introduction of 4-way flasher hazard warning switches in cars has helped a great deal in
reducing collision pile-up accidents. However, in dense fog this system is inadequate, despite the use of
bright rear light fog lights, recommended when vision is less than 150 ft. Low cost car theft alarm
actuators operate in the 430 MHz frequency range and have an action radius of about 300 ft. A 430 MHz
transceiver in cars coupled to the 4-way flasher control switch could be used. When this switch is on, that
is the flasher is working, the transmitter is active within a radius of about 300 ft. When the switch is off, the
normal position, the transceiver is in the receive mode. The first cars to approach a hazard will normally
actuate their 4-way flashers, thus transmitting the danger signal to cars behind them. The received signal
will cause the indicator switch of the 4-way hazard flashing control to flash, or provide some other warning,
thus notifying the following cars of a possible hazard ahead.
Behavioural Effects of Signal Changes in the Fog-Warning Function of Motorway Signalling
Authors: Hogema, JH; Van Nifterick, W
Source: Ertico, Rue de la Regence 61, Brussels, 1000, Belgium
ITS America, 400 Virginia Avenue SW, Washington DC, 20024-2730
Journal: Mobility for Everyone. 4th World Congress on Intelligent Transport Systems, 21-24 October 1997,
Berlin, paper no. 2396
Publication Year: 1997
Language: English
Abstract: A driving simulator study was conducted to study the behavioural effects of signal changes
of a fog signalling system. Fog signalling is an automatic system which in case of fog shows a speed
limit to passing drivers that is adjusted to the visibility conditions. The signals as perceived by drivers
may change in space (being confronted with different messages on subsequent signs) or in time (seeing
a message change from one state to another while passing a sign). In the experiment, subjects drove in
a simulated motorway environment with several fog scenarios, both with and without a fog warning
system. The experiment consisted of two parts, dealing with signal changes in space and in time,
respectively. This paper summarises the effects on free-driving speed found in both parts.
Automatic Fog Warning.
Author: Winstanley, J. V.
Corporate Source: Plessey Radar, Cowes, Engl
Source: Systems Technology No. 22 Oct 1975 p 26-31
Publication Year: 1975
Language: English
Abstract: This article outlines an automatic system of fog detection and gaging to allow appropriate
accident prevention steps to be taken. Two separate optical sensors gage the visibility level: a point
visibility meter measures the fog density as a light scattering function, and a background light meter
simulates the sensitivity of the human eye to prevailing lighting conditions. The combined signals are
transmitted to a control room for analysis and display/alarm.
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Fog warning. A step towards automation in accident prevention.
Author: Michaelis, E. E.
Source: Roads and Road Construction v 49 n 588 Dec 1971, pp. 430-431
Publication Year: 1971
Language: English
Abstract: Features of a special transmissometer developed by Sick Optik-Elektronik of Munich,
West Germany in which the light from a single source is split into two light beams which are made to
pass through holes in a rotating disk so that the light is modulated to two different frequencies, and light
of the one frequency is made to cross the distance over which the measurement is to be made, while
the light from the other beam is used for comparison purposes.
Fog Warning Devices for Highway Traffic. (NEBELWARNGERAETE FUER DEN STRASSENVERKEHR.)
Authors: Fruengel, F.; Gelbke, E.
Source: Impulsphys, Hamburg, Ger., Strassenverkehrstechnik V 18 N 5 p 156-165. ISSN: 0039-2219
Publication Date: Sept-Oct 1974
Language: German
Abstract: The measurement of visibility in fog, with the purpose of switching on warning traffic signals,
requires visibility measuring instruments which are clearly different from those used at airports and
weather stations. The requirements with regard to fog warning devices for road traffic are set forth.
Among them are: the warning threshold distance of from 80 to 150 m visibility, a continuous recording
of the measured visibility value, and low electric power requirements. Measurements by means of a
transmissometer and a videograph are described. The effects are summed up. Visibility distances of
dimmed lights, of the main beam, or rear light in conditions of bright fog, twilight, or at night can be
read out from the tables presented.

Tech Brief – Highway Fog Warning System
FHWA Publication No. FHWA-RD-99-110, April 1999. Available on-line at
http://www.itsdocs.fhwa.dot.gov//JPODOCS/PERIODIC//76M01!.PDF

California-Oregon Advanced Transportation Systems (COATS) Showcase Projects
Abstract: The Showcase effort is a multi-year, rurally focused research project that seeks to provide
information that may improve the performance of existing intelligent transportation systems (ITS)
elements, and to provide data to justify, support or direct future deployment of ITS in northern California
and southern Oregon (see Figure 1). Showcase consists of multiple independent evaluation activities that
exist to support the goals, objectives and desired benefits established for ITS planning and deployment in
the rural California/Oregon Advanced Transportation Systems (COATS) project (see Tables 1 and 2).
Showcase evaluations are performed by the Western Transportation Institute (WTI) at Montana State
University-Bozeman. The purpose of this document is to provide a summary of current evaluation
activities that are funded under the Showcase project. It provides a status update on active evaluations,
highlighting recent activities completed under each evaluation, and identifying future research directions. It
also gives the status on inactive evaluations, to document previous deliverable and when future activity (if
any) may be expected
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1.16.3 Verification of Completion of Contractual Tasks based on Contract Schedule A: Project
Description (OTS-38b)

From Office of Traffic Safety SCHEDULE A, PROJECT NO: RS0034
Specific Project Tasks by Phase (modified for delayed start of contract to 7/1/00):
Phase 1 – Program Preparation (7/1/00 - 6/30/01)
1.1 Work with D10 on system access. This initial phase will be devoted to developing and implementing
appropriate mechanisms for fully automated collection of data at two field sites located on Southbound
Interstate 5, at Caltrans-designated sites French Camp Slough and County Hospital. Work begins by working
out final arrangements with District 10 and Caltrans Operations personnel for access to equipment,
communications, and archived data required for evaluation. The objective of this preliminary effort will be to
have fully autonomous data collection in operation prior to the 2000-2001 fog season, which traditionally
extends from October through March.
This task was completed 12/31/2001, although the process was ongoing for the duration of the project.
1.2 Monitoring software design and implementation. As required for Task 1.3, below, software will be
developed to facilitate monitoring, remote access, secure communications, and autonomous operation of
equipment installed at field sites and in the TMC in District 10.
This phase was completed 6/30/2002.
1.3 Setup of data collection, communications and processing equipment. Several technical
alternatives have been identified for achieving this objective. Final details and decisions will be made in
cooperation with Caltrans technical personnel, especially with the system designers. The proposed workplan
herein follows the mechanization suggested by Caltrans District and technical personnel in meetings
conducted during September-October 1999. A separate data collection and communications server will be
set up in the District 10 Traffic Management Center for the exclusive purpose of comminuting with and
acquiring data from the three existing systems that operationally comprise the CAWS. These systems are
designated by Caltrans as the Signview Computer, the Qualimetrics/Caltrans Meteorological System, and the
Traffic Monitoring Computer. The server will also provide archiving and preliminary data reduction functions,
and provide a mechanism for remote FTP download of data to the evaluation team facilities for processing.
This task was completed 630/2002
Phase 1 Deliverables: Quarter report describing Phase 1 technical activities.
Delivered.
Phase 2 – Implementation (9/1/00 - 6/30/02)
2.1 Completion of instrumentation, communications, and system integration at the French Camp
Slough and County Hospital field sites. The proposed budget includes provisions for subcontract work by
Qualimetrics required for completion of the French Camp installation, inclusion of this tenth site into the
software running on the Meteorological System computer, and communications hardware and software
modifications required to permit data access by the server computer.
This phase has been completed 9/1/2002 per original requirements, with addition of two field acquisition sites
in 2003.
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2.2 Set up remote CCTV monitoring of visibility and traffic conditions. The evaluation team will install a
remote CCTV camera and compressed video telecommunications system at one site, to be selected in
cooperation with District 10. CCTV site installation work will be performed by a subcontractor to be selected,
subject to Caltrans approval. Within the field of view of this camera will be at least one weather monitoring
station (preferably the County Hospital station), and a set of five visibility test targets at selected distances
from the camera. The video feed from this camera will be accessible to the District TMC as well as the
evaluators from their San Luis Obispo Laboratory. Since the video feed will be carried (securely) over the
Internet, it will also be accessible, with password access, to any other Caltrans office or any authorized
research institution. The visibility reference targets will be approximately the same as those deployed in the
earlier 1973 "Operation Fogbound" study performed in District 10. If desired by Caltrans, the video feed may
also be made accessible to the public via the District 10 / CAWS web site.
This task was completed 9/1/2002.
2.3 Set up remote system access. The evaluation team will set up dedicated full-time Internet connectivity
in the District 10 TMC to facilitate remote access to the evaluation server for data access and remote control.
This capability will also permit public access to a District 10 CAWS Web site, to be described in Task 2.4,
below. A service contract will be let to an Internet Access/Service Provider (ISP).
This task was modified since it was not possible to gain access to the CAWS computes in the District 10 TMC.
These design and deployment of a distributed data acquisition at five filed sites in addition a central database
server replaced this task. Work was completed 3/1/2002 but continuous improvements were made over the
course of the evaluation project.
2.4 Set up District 10 / CAWS Web site. At the discretion of Caltrans and the OTS, the evaluation team will
also assist Caltrans District 10 in making the public and transportation community aware of the CAWS by
creating and maintaining an Internet Web site for the District, with hyperlinked information access for all
aspects of the system, its performance and history. If technically feasible, a real-time mechanism for display
on the Web site of immediate traffic, visibility and hazard information may be implemented. This may serve as
a public aid for trip planning and routing, with some potential benefit in improved safety and reduced traffic
congestion.
This task was completed 6/30/2003, although the support for this server continued for the remainder of the
project.
Phase 2 Deliverables: Completed field instrumentation. CCTV installation at a selected location in CAWS
study area. Internet-based remote network access service, linking evaluation laboratory with District 10 TMC.
CAWS web page and links. Quarter Report describing Phase 2 activities and accomplishments.
All delivered, as documented in final report.
Phase 3 – Real-time Data Collection and Analysis (1/1/01-6/30/02)
3.1 Operation, maintenance and field service. To assure continuous operation of all evaluation-related
components, we will work with District personnel to assure proper operation and maintenance of all field
instrumentation and the server and it’s communications interfaces in the District 10 Traffic Management
Center (TMC).
This ongoing task was completed at contract termination 6/30/2005.
3.2 Data collection, archiving, processing, and interpretation. The evaluation team will be responsible for
collection, archiving, reduction, processing and interpretation of all data generated by the installed
instruments, as well as data sets generated by the CAWS itself. A research assistant will be placed on site in
the District 10 TMC to handle all manual data collection tasks and assist district personnel with system
operation and maintenance. Caltrans technical cooperation will be required for interpretation of the system’s
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several data encoding strategies and protocols. All data reduction, processing and interpretation will be
performed by the evaluation team in San Luis Obispo.
The ongoing task was completed at contract termination 6/30/2005.
Phase 3 Deliverables: Technical support for field instrumentation installed by evaluation team. Quarter
report(s) describing data collection activities and reporting preliminary results, observations and limitations.
CAWS evaluation system with full documentation was delivered to Caltrans District 10 on 5/24/2005. All
ongoing support tasks were completed at contract termination 6/30/2005.
Phase 4 – Archival Data Collection and Analysis (10/1/00 - 6/30/02)
4.1 Assess operational issues. While no further study of operational issues is planned, the evaluators will
observe the operation of the CAWS system over the evaluation period, and inspect maintenance and service
records to identify any obvious or potential areas of unreliability or serviceability problems. In cooperation with
Caltrans technical personnel, remedial actions may be suggested.
This ongoing task was completed at contract termination 6/30/2005.
4.2 Crash data statistical analysis. The evaluation team will reactivate previous efforts to acquire and
analyze long-term traffic crash data via the TASIS data base and District ten collisions records. Archived
statistics 1971-96 on vehicle crashes, including reported causal factors, traffic and atmospheric conditions,
number of vehicles involved, severity and fatality rate, will be obtained (to the extent available) for the study
area with the cooperation of Caltrans and the NHTSA. External influences, such as improvements in vehicle
and highway technologies, changes in traffic patterns and volumes, or differences in weather patterns will be
identified, and efforts will be made to study their possible influences upon the statistical conclusions. The
objectives of this task are not only to establish before-and-after statistical loss trends, but to better relate driver
behavior to the measurable data obtained from field sensors (e.g., speed distribution and headway
distribution). This also affords an opportunity to identify potentially correlated phenomena via Multivariate
Analysis of Variance (MANOVA), which has been used previously in the 1991-94 evaluation of a similar Fog
Warning system in the Netherlands.
This task was completed with the delivery of the final report.
Phase 4 Deliverables: Statistical analysis of archived and current traffic incident data, as described above.
Quarter Report discussing operational issues, if any, as described above.
The phase was completed with the delivery of the final report.
Phase 5 – Long-term Monitoring Infrastructure (4/1/02 - 10/1/02)
5.1 Long-term data collection system design. Following the limited evaluation period, the evaluation team
will attempt to leave in place in the District an autonomous system for continued data collection, archiving and
processing. This will facilitate the eventual generation of conclusions based upon long-term data and
observations, for future analysis and study.
This task was completed 6/30/2005.
5.2 Configure system for autonomous operation. The system and long-term data collection procedures
designed in the preceding task will be configured, activated and debugged to the extent possible within
practical constraints and resource limits.
This task was completed with the activation of the CAWS Evaluation System 9/1/2001. Continuous
improvements were made over the remaining duration of the project.
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Phase 5 Deliverables: Design and installation of means (to be determined in consultation with Caltrans) for
permanent automated means for data collection, archiving and processing. Quarter Report describing Phase
5 activities and accomplishments.
The phase was completed with the handoff of the CAWS Evaluation System to Caltrans 5/24/2005.
Phase 6 – Reports and Dissemination of Results (10/1/00 - 6/30/03)
6.1 Quarter reports. The project coordinator will prepare and submit all project reports in accordance with
OTS requirements specified with the Grant Program Manual Chapter 7.
All quarter reports delivered on due dates.
6.2 Publication of methodologies and results. One or more technical papers covering various aspects of
the project evaluation will be authored with Caltrans and OTS co-authors, for publication in one or more
appropriate technical forums.
Publication of TRB journal paper 2005, Caltrans Fog Forum Presentations 2001 and 2002, and National
Visibility Conference presentation 2004.
6.3, 6.4 Final report preparation. The project coordinator will prepare and submit a comprehensive final
project report in accordance with OTS requirements specified with the Grant Program Manual Chapter 7.
Final report (5 volumes) delivered.
Phase 6 Deliverables: Final comprehensive evaluation report. One review and revision cycle. Publication of
results, consistent with Caltrans policies.
All deliverables complete except for agency review of final report.
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